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Milanovic shows  that  two  types  ot factors  explain  "given"  inequality.
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This paper presents an alternative hypothesis  why income inequality differs between the
countries. The only currently existing hypothesis  was formulated  by Kuznets  (1955). Kuznets'
hypothesis  is briefly reviewed in Section 2. It provides an indispensable  background  to our
"augmented"  Kuznets' hypothesis  which is formulated in Section 3. The empirical assessment
of our hypothesis  is presented  in Section  4. The hypothesis  is t:sted on a cross-sectional  sample
of 80 countries  including  all OECD countries, all European  (former) socialist  countries, and 50
A^rican,  Asian, and Latin American  countries.  The data are from the 1980s. Section  5 spells  out
the main conclusions  and implications  of our hypothesis.
2. The Background: the Kuznets' Relationship
When it comes to factors that explain differences in size income distribution  between the
countries, there exists only one broad hypothe.sis,  proposed almost 40 years ago by Simon
Kuznets  (1955). It became  famous as the Kuznets' inverted  U curve. The hypothesis  states that
at very low levels  of income,  income inequality  must also be low, as practically  everybody  lives
at, or close to, subsistence  level. There is no room for increased inequality  because  <.'  the
small size of overall output increased inequality  would  push many  people below the subsiatence
level. As the process of growth begins, income inequality increases. People migrate from the
traditional  agricultural  sector where incomes are low to the modern  industrial sector where both
the (expected)  wage is higher and wage differentiatior.  is greater. Kuznets' model is thus also
consistent with the Lewis-type pattern of growth. At the early stage of development, both
physical and human capital are scarce and unequally  distributed (that is, heavily concentrated
among the few), and owners of human and physical capital are able to command high returns.
As the two types  of capital  accumulate  and become  more diffused  among  the population,  the rate
of return on the physical capital  declines  while wage differentials  between skilled and unskilled
labor diminish. Incor,ae  distribution becomes more equal. The process 'v.as summarized as
follows  by Kuznets  (1966, p. 217): "It seems plausible  to assume that in the process of growth,the earlier periods are characterized  by a balance  of counteracting  forces that may have widened
the inequality  in the size distribution  of total income for a while because  or the rapid growth of
tl-  non-A [non-agricultural]  sector and wider inequality  within it. Tt  is even more plausible to
argue that the recent nirrowing in income inequality  observed in the developed  countries was
due to a combination  of the narrowing inter-sectoral  inequalities in produc, per worker, the
decline in the share of property incomes in total incomes of households, and the institutional
changes that reflect decisions  concerning  social security and full employment."
Ktuznets'  empirical relationship  has been extensively studied in both the cross-country  and
inter-temporal  contexts. It remains the subject of controversy. 2 The controversy has centered
on: (1) the very existence of the relationship (it was argued that the Kuznets relationship
critically depends on  Latin American countries which are  at  an  intermediate stage  of
develbpment,  and for reasons peculiar to them, exhibit high inequality), 3 (2) its validity for
different countries and regions, 4 and (3) its validity for different epochs. Kaelble  and Thomas
(1991, p.32) have recently thus summarized the empirical results of the Kuznets hypothesis:
"Incomne  levels explain cnly a small part of the variance of the inequality measures. This
suggests that  national characteristics (whether in  terms  of  economic structure,  political
institutions, socio-cultural  heritage, or whatever)  play an important  part in determining  exactly
what level of  inequality is  to  be  found at  any particular  level of  modernization." No
comprehensive  alternative hypothesis  regarding determinants  of income inequality has so far
been suggested,  however.
2Reviews of  theory and evidence on  the  Kuznets curve  are  extremely numerous. A
particularly useful subset would include Lindert and Williamson  (1985), Kaelble and Thomas
(1991), Williamson  (1991a),  Polak and Williamson  (1991), Paukert (1973), aid Lecaillon  et al.
(1984). Williamson ""91)  provides a  useful summary of the country studies and tries to
determine  if there is historical  evidence for the Kuznets  curve in Great Britain; Dumke (1991),
Soderberg (1991), and Thomas (1991) in the same volume do the same thing respectively  for
Germany, Sweden,  and Australia. Ram  (1991)  applies the Kuznets  hypothesis  to the states of the
Us.
3See, for example, recent criticism by Atldnson and Micklewright  (1992, p.35).
4For the denial of its validity in Asia, see Ushima (1991, p.121); for the absence of the
Kuznets  curve in Japan, see Lindert and Williamson  (1985, p.354).
s/  2It is worth pointing  out, in light of the alternative  hypothesis  proposed  here, that the Kuznets'
hypothesis  puts at center stage the role of economic factors, that is, of the supply of,  and
demand for, various factors  of prodcCLAun.S  The forces of economic  development  determine  the
shape  of income  distribution.  Societies  do not choose  the income  distribution  that they would  like
to have. T}.' process is led by inexorable  economic forces, and deviations frorr. the income
distribution that a country must have at a certain level of development are  small and non-
systematic.
3. A New Hypothesis
Here, I propose an "augmented"  Kuznets' hypothesis. I argue that size income distnbution
is determined  (1) by factors that are in the short-run, from the point of view of policy makers
or society  as a whole, "given", and (2) by social (or public policy) choice.  The "givens"  are
(1) the level of income and (2) the regional  heterogeneity  of a country. Neither of these factors
can be influenced strongly in the short-run. The level of development (level of ir.come) is
obviously  a variable that changes  slowly; so is, and for the same reasons, the inherited  regional
inequality. No amount of government  redistribution  will transform, in a few years, Sicily into
Lombardy,  nor, in the former  Soviet  Union, Kyrghzystan  into Estonia. The public policy  factors
are (1) the percentage of workers employed in the state and the para-statal sector, and (2) the
extent  of government  transfers, measured  as a share of a country's GDP. These two factors are
the products  of political  decisions,  both current and past (e.g. a country might have a large s.  .te
sector because of a  strong past influence  of  socialist parties). In the empirical section that
follows, I will address two key questions:  (1) Are social choice factors statistically  significant
"explanators"  of cross-country  income inequality?  and (2) If so, how large is their influence?
The "given" factors are not new. They have already been included  in the numerous studies
of cross-country  income inequality.  This applies not only ,o income as in the strong variant of
the Kuznets hypothesis  where income alone determines income inequality, but also to regional
'I  use thc qualifier "at center stage" because Kuznets' was indeed aware, as the earlier
quotation  make-s  clear, of the role of institutional  factors in income distribution.
/  3heterogeneity.  The point was made in earlier studies that the heterogen'eity  of the country will
have an impact on  income inequality. The total population (Pryor,  1973, pp.  83ff.) or the
geographical  size of a country were used as control variables, assuming that larger or more
populous  countries will tend to be more heterogeneous.  These assumptions are dubious. For
example, in the former Yugoslavia, equal in size to the state of Oregon and in population  to
California, the ratio of per capita income between the richest and the poorest republic was
almost 8:1, whereas in the much larger United States the ratio between the richest and tUe
poorest state in 1980 was only 2:1. More exact indicators than geographic  size would need to
be use 4 to reflect a country's heterogeneity.  In the empirical part of the paper, I use, for each
country, the ratio in average income between its richest and its poorest territorial unit (state,
republic,  province, ldnder in the case of federal states;  prefectures, counties,  etc. in the case of
unitary states).6
The heterogeneity  of the country, however, requires  special attention.  If we consider  regional
difference  as a datui 1 m, in the sense that i, reflects iong-standing  and slow-changing  features of
different regions that are not significant  y influenced in  the short-run by social policy, the
inclusion  of regional heterogeneity  as an eWxplanatory  variable is appropriate.  Thus, if we take
the former Soviet Union or Brazil as examples, it could be argued that, everything  else being
the same (income, social transfers, state-sector employment etc.),  these courtries could be
expected to have a more unequal income distribution than some others, such as France or
Sweden,  owing to historically  different regional income levels. One would  also expt-ct  that this
year's social policy (or that of the last several years) would have almost no effect on the ratio
of average incomes between (say) Russia and Tajikistan, and Sao Paolo and Rondonia. If
nothing else changes except that a country splits up, as happened with the Soviet Union, size
income inequality within each of the new countries will decrease precisely because regional
differences  will be less. The inclusion  of a variable that captures regional  heterogeneity  is then
'Clearly, this is not a perfect measure  either. Heterogeneity  will increase  the smaller the size
of the units. There also the usual problems associated with the use of extreme values only.
However, as can be observed in the Annex, the variable seems to reflect relatively well the
heterogeneity  of the countries.
4legitimate.
However, if one believes  that regional inequality  is also influenced  by the variables which
we hold to  determine personal income distribution, then the model may be  misspecified.
Regional  inequality  may, in effect, be the dependent  variable, explained  by the same factors  as
personal income inequality.  If the first hypothesis  is true (regional  differences  are  'given"), then
thc correlation between regional inequality  and other explanatory  variables must be low, and
significantly  lower than the correlaticn  between the other explanatory  variables and size income
inequality. In the empirical section, I shall therefore always present two versions of  each
equation: with and without  the rngionJ heterogeneity  variable.
What is new in our  "augmented" Kuznets hypothesis is the role of  social choice. Our
nypothesis  says that -- once the "given" elements are accounted for -- there is still siz^able
discretion regarding income inequality. Income 4istribution  is viewed also as the product of
social  choices mediated  through  elections,  lobbying  of various social  groups, societal  preferences
or historical  devclopments.  Thus, some countries may have a greater proportion of state-sector
workers  because  socialist  or Communist  parties were historically  stronger;  or the population  may
have a high preference for eradicating  povert, and redistributing  income through transfers; or
the middle  classes which  decisively  determine  the size of transfers  in developed  democracies  may
have  had experience  of downward  mobility  and may regard transfers  as an insurance  proposition
(lest they become poor) as argued by Lindert (1989 and 1991). In any case, variables such as
the size of the state sector and the size of transfers will be determined  through the interaction
of social forces, or put rmore  broadly, by the political economy  of the country.
Consider now  the influence  of the two "social  choice" elements  in more Jetail. The large size
of the state sector will tend to reduce inequality  because  of a more compressed  wage distribution
existing in the state compared to the private sector. More bureauciatic structures, in which
earnings are largely determined  by seniority  and academic  credentials,  are believed to reward
those at .he top relatively less and to pay relatively more to those at the bottom. This is
confirmed by empirical studies. Bishop, Formby, and Thistie (1991, p.430) find that wage
distribution  in the U.S. government  sector  is consistently  more  egalitaria. than in manufacturing,
/  5services  or agriculture (all of which are entirely private). Meron (1991) obtains the same result
for France. Blank (1993, pp. 29-30) writes: "Pu',lic sector workers [in the U.S. and the UK]
face more compressed wage distribution than do private sector workers. For  almost every
occupation  in cvery year in both countries, M'th the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile of
wages in the public sector are closer to the mean public sector wages than are 10th percendle
and 90th  )ercentile of  wages iP the private sector." Further confirmation of  the levelling
tendencies present in  state-owned  enterprises is provided by  socialist countries, where the
majority of  workers (outside agriculture) were or  are employed ir. the state sector. Wage
distribution  in socialism,  adjusted for the heterogeneity  of the country, tends to be more equal
than in capitalism.  Thus Phelps-Brown  (1988, p.303) writes that lower inequality  in Soviet-type
economies  "arises mainly from a slower rise of income above the' median, that is, t-oadly: the
more skilled manual occupations and  still more .he higher clerical, the professional and
administrative,  are paid less than in the West relatively  to the bulk of manuial  workers." 7
There is yet another reason wh.y  a high level ot  state involvement  in the organization  of an
economy may lead to lower inequality. The point was made by Hirschman (1973, p.558)  "[i]f
decision-making  is perceived  to be largely decentralized,  individual  advances are attriouted to
chance, or possihlv merit (or dement). When decision making is known to be centralized, such
advances  will be attributed  to favoritism....  [Centralized  systems]  will strain to be more  egalitarian
not just because they want to, but also because they have to: centralization  of decision making
largely  deprives them of tolerance  for inequality  that is available  to more decent-alized  systems".
I am not aware of previous attempts to link explicitly, at the economy-wide  level, the share
'See also Phelps-Brown  (1977,  p.286) and Lydall  (1968). Atkinson  and Micklewright  (1992,
pp.81ff.) show that Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland have consistently lower earnings
inequality than the UK. The USSR and the UK have about the same level of inequality of
earnings; the former is, however, regionally much more heterogeneous. Comparisons  are, of
course, strewn with many  problems. State sector wages in socialism  are almost always on net
basis, wages in capitalism  are gross. This imparts an upward bias to income inequality  in market
economies.  The opposite  bias, however, has to do with the absence  of unemployment  in socialist
countries. This means that even those with low productivity, often unemployed in  market
economies, will be wa".e  earners in socialist  economies.
6of the state-sector  employment  to size .ncome ineqluality.  Some indirect  attempts  were made -- for
example, through  the introduction  of the dummy  variable for socialist  countries. In some studies
(e.g. Kaelb!e  and Thortlas, 1991, or Ahluwalia,  1976)  the socialist  dummy  variable was found to
be significant (lowering inequality) while in others its effeot was negligible (Dye and Ziegler,
1988). Here, however, I propose to  use a continuous variable that spans almost the entire
theoretical  spectrum  from 100  nercent of state employment  (USSR  and Czechoslovakia  before the
change of the regime) and almost 0 ?prcent (e.g., 3 percent for Madagascar  and Senegal).
The extent of government transters will also tend to  reduce inequality. The relationship,
however,  is not unambiguous,  because the reduction  in ineqjality achieved  by a given amount of
government  transfers will vary. The reduction of inequali+,  will depend on the cxtent to which
transfers are focused  on the poor. If most transfers are captured by those who pay taxes out of
which the trans-ers are financed, the reduction in inequality may be small (the theory of the
middle class capture of benefits argued by Le Grand, 1982 and Sawyer, 1982). However, on
balance, the larger the transfers are, the greater will be the reduction in inequality, even if the
relationship  may  be concave, that  is, additional  increases  in transfers may  lower inequality  by less
and less.
74. Testing the New Hypothesis
The D-  i
The sample consists of 22 OECD countries, 8 socialist European countries including the
former Soviet Union  16 African, 17 Asian, and 17 Latin American countries. For these 80
countries I have been able to col!ect the necessaiy  information,  compatible  in both the definition
of the variables  and the time-period  (mostly  early to mid-1980s).  These 80 countries acccJnt for
98.8 percent of world GDP and 90 percent of world population. 8 The list of the countries, the
data, and their sources are given in Annex  Tables 1-4.
in undertakings  of this scope, the data represent  a particular problem. It is therefore  important
to discuss them in some detail. Income distribution  data are gei  rally thought to be among the
least reliable  types  of macroeconomic  data. The problems  that hinder comparability  are numerous.
The most frequently  mentioned  are the fcllowing:  How representative  are household  rurveys on
the basis of which income inequality is estimated?  What is the type of incorrei  (original, gross,
or disposable)?  Who are the recipients  (households,  families  or individuals)?  How are they ranked
(by total household income or  by household per capita income or  by equivalent household
income)?  Therefore, in Annex  Table 4, I have indicated  exactly the type of income and recipient
from which the Gini coefficients are calculated. A general requirement, satisfied for al! the
countries, was twofold: the data should  be derived from household surveys and they should be
nationally-representative.
For the OECD  countries, I have relied heavily  on the Luxembourg  Income  Study (LIS) where
a special effort was made to gencrate consistent  data across the countries. For most of the OECD
countries, the Gini coefficients  are calculated  for disposable (after both transfers and personal
taxcs) per capita income. The recipients are individuals. This means that each individual in a
household  is assigned the same, household  per capita, income. The same principle was applied
to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where most of direct taxation is in the form of
'GDP figures exclude  the Soviet Union and East Germrany.  Taiwan and Hong Kong are not
included  in either population  or GDP figures.
8payroll taxes. Most of East European  data were directly calculated  from the published  household
surveys. For the Latin American  and Caribbean  (LAC) countries, .he majority of the data come
from a single source (Psacharopoulos  et al., 1992) which itself is based on household  surveys  of
very similar design as  those used for OECD countries and Eastern Europe (distribution of
individuals  by their per capita income). However, income is almost always gross (i.e. inclusive
of transfers, but not of personal taxes) rather than disposable  income: since personal taxation  is
minimal  in LAC countries,  the two measures  do not differ by much. Full comparability  was more
difficult to ensure for Africa and Asia. The problem here is less the income concept  -- gross and
disposable  income  are practically  the same -- but rather the reliability  of the surveys. I have used
Iublished  results which I have tried to render as consistent  as possible, often by using the data
from the same source (e.g., a single comparative  paper). The problems, however, remain: it is
mostly households,  rather than individuals, that are treated as recipient units. This imparts an
upward bias to the aata. Finally, regardirg the time-period: for all but 10 countries, the Gini
coefficients  are from the 1980s  (including 1979).  The reader can check how close the definitions
and the time-periods  are in Annex Table 4. I believe that the data represent the most consistent
set of the Gini coefficients  existing at present.
Among  explanatory  variables, social transfers as a percentage  of GDP and GDP per capita in
equivalent  purchasing  power are relatively  easily available. OECD and ILO data are the source
for cash and in-kind social expenditures  for most of the countries; these data were complemented
by various World Bank, IMF and individual  countries' publications (see Annex Table 2). For
practically  all tne countries, the data refer to the year 1985  or the 1980s  average. The purchasing
power  equivalent  GDr per capita in 1988  or 1985  is obtained for practically  all the countries  from
Summers  and Heston (1991). The exceptions  are several East European countries that were not
included in the Summers-Heston  sample. Estimates  for these countries are made by the World
Bank.
Since both income  concepts  (disposable  and gross income)  used for the calculation  of the Gini
coefficient  include transfers, size of transfers will, it is argued, directly influence  both types of
GINI. But, in addition, there may  be also indirect  effects  of social transfers. As documented  (see
Danziger,  Haveman  and Plotnick 1981  for a review  of the U.S. experience,  or Atkinson  1987  and
9Atkinson et al.,  1984 for the UK experience) the existence of transfers leads to changes in
behavior  of firms and individuals  and thus affects their pre-fisc income. For example, existence
of unemployment  insurance may reduce willingness  to work and reduce person's labor income.
If that person is poor and his overall income,  equal to income from unemployment  allowance, is
less than would be his income from labor (in absence of unernplpoyment  insurance),  a perverse
situation may appear where increased transfers -- existence of unemployment insurance -- lead to
greater inequality. I cannot account for this effect. I must assume that the indirect effect is
sufficiently  small to be swamped  by the direct effect of transfers on income distributuon.
The size of the state sector is more difficult to obtain. Again, for the OECD countries, the
OECD  publications  are the best source (even  if such publications  are not as exhaustive  and up-to-
date as  one  would expect). East  European countries generally provide, in  their statistical
yearbooks,  very detailed data on the size of the state sector (and the cooperative  secor).  For the
LAC  countries, Psacharopoulos  et al. (1992) has also been used extensively  because household
surveys provide information  on the employer (state, private, own-account)  of the interviewed
individuals.  For Africa and Asia, the main  sources were countries' statistical  yearbooks.  In almost
all cases, the denominator (state sector as percentage of  what) wis  the labor force or  the
economically active  population. Both  include the  officially unemployed and  agricultural
underemployment;  both exclude  students,  housewives,  etc. that is, people  of working  age who are
not economically  active outside their household.'  Aimost all of the data refer to the 1980s (see
Annex Table 1).
The heterogeneity  variable is not only the most problematic  in analytical  sense; it is so in an
empirical sense as well. I have tried to use the ratio of household  incomes (per capita or total
household)  between the richest  and the poorest region as the preferred indicator. But even if such
data existed for all the countries, changing  administrative  divisions  alone would produce  changes
in the results. Clearly, the greater is the number of administrative  units in a country, the larger
is the ratio. I have therefore indicated, in Annex Table 3, the number of administrative  units
The distinction is, of course, somewhat  artificial in the case of countries  with agricultural
underemployment.
/'  10which  are being compared (e.g. 10 regions or 16 provinces  or 24 departments). In addition, ratio
in  incomes was not always available. I  have then had to  resort to  proxies like consumer
expenditures,  wage  bills per region, or even, in some  cases, per capita consumption  of electricity
(for five countries)  or per capita ownership  of consumer  durables such as cars or TV sets (for six
countries).
The explanatory  variables  are therefore  the following: INCOME = the country's purchasing
power 1988 GDP per capita (in thousands  of 1988 international  dollars); RATIO = the ratio of
average incomes between the richest and the poorest region within a country; STATE - the
percentage  of all employed  who  work in the state sector (inclusive  of government  administration);
and TRANS = the percentage  share of cash and in-kind  social transfers (pensions,  maternity  and
family allowances, temporary  sick pay, unemployment  compensations,  education, and health) in
the country's GDP. The dependent  variable is the Gini coefficient  of disposable income (GINI)
expressed for convenience  in percentages:  Gini coefficient  of 30 (instead  of 0.3).
Two further points need to be clarified. An apparent inconsistency  may be detected between
the inclusion  of in-kind transfers like education  and health in the TRANS variable, and concern
with  disposable income inequality (which excludes public  in-kind transfers) in  the  GINI
variable. 10 The rationale fcr  this is  that public expenditures on  health and education are
conducive  to more equal distribution  of human captal which, in turn, reduces the inequality  of
disposable  income: for example, more widely spread public education is likely to reduce wage
differences.
Second, the analysis is conducted in per capita terms rather than in terms of equivalent
consumption  units. There are several  reasons for this. There are practical  ones, because most of
the income distribition  data for non-OECD  countries  are expressed  in per capita terms; also, even
when income distribution is done in terms of equivalency  units, the weights used in different
studies are different. There are also more substantive  reasons for using the per capita measure.
If we require that GINI be reported in equivalent  units should  we not require the same for GDP?
"'Disposable  income includes money  income  plus in-kind consumption.
/'  11The most compelling  reason is that the very idea of equivalency  units is country-dependent  (or
rather price-structure)  dependent.  If rents, for example, are subsidized, then economies  of scale
are much less important  than if they are not; if education  is private, the cost of children is much
higher (their weight may be higher than the weight of an adult) than if education  is public and
free. In consequence,  the use of per capita terms has both practical and substantive  adventages.
Empirical Analysis
The regression  with the expected  signs of the coefficients  is given below. The income  variable
is quadratic, since we test for the existence  of an inverted U-shaped  relationship.
GINI  = fct  [INCOME, RATIO  (+) ,STATE (-)  ,TRANS (-)].
The expected negative sign of TRANS deserves a further comment. As has been ar 
increased  social transfers will tend to reduce the inequality  of disposable  or gross income. b  . ln
some recent studies (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1992; Persson and Tabellini, 1992) whic;.
concerned  with determinants  of social transfers, higher income inequality is shown to lead, it
conditions of wide franchise, to high redistribution. It would hence appear that inequality  and
transfers are positively related. The example underscores the ambiguity with which the term
'income inequality" is used. The positive relationship  between income inequality and transfers
makes sense only  if  one  has  in  mind inequality of  market  income (before government
redistribution)." 1 It is then logical to assume that if market incomes are distributed unequally,
people  (i.e. the median  voter) will vote  for large redistribution  because  they will thereby  gain. But
both Alesina and Rodrik (1992) and Persson and Tabellini (1992) use measures of  income
inequality  after government  cash transfers. Consequently,  the cross-country  relationship  between
market  income inequality  and TRANS may  be positive (because  taxes are higher in more unequal
countries), while the cross-country  relationship  between  TRANS and disposable  or gross income
"Market or original income is the income prior to any government  redistribution  (ideally,
it should be even prior to payroll taxes deducted at source). Gross income is equal to market
income plus all cash government  transfers. Disposable  income is equal to gross income minus
all direct taxes.
12inequality  may  be negative  (because  transfers  paid out of taxes lower inequality).  The two income
inequalities -- pre- and post-government -- are in effect two entirely different variables.
Table 1 gives summary  statistics  for the five regions. The most important  conclusions  are the
following. (1) In terms of income inequality, the five regions have distinctly different averages:
inequality is highest in Africa (Gini of 52), closely followed by Latin America (49), then Asia
(41), OECD countries (31), while the European socialist  economies  are the most equal (25). (2)
Eastern Europe  and the former  Soviet Union  have a much  larger share  of state sector employment
than does any other region (90 percent); the African  and Asian samples  have the lowest share (11
to 12 percent of the labor force). (3) The size of social transfers is much greater in OECD  and
socialist  countries  than elsewhere. (4) Regional  heterogeneity  within countries is largest in Latin
America, followed  by Africa; OECD countries are the most homogeneous.
Table 1. Summary  statistics for the five regions
Region  GINI  STATE  TRANS  RATIO  INCOME  Number
OECD  31.2  21.2  22.6  1.8  12501  22
E. Europe  24.8  90.0  17.2  2.5  6234  8
Africa  52.3  11.3  5.7  4.8  1778  16
Asia  41.0  12.6  6.8  3.3  4851  17
L.America  49.2  19.3  7.6  7.0  4156  17
Note: All the statistics  are unweighted  averages.
Definition of the variables:
Region:  For the list of countries  see Annex. Algeria, China, and Cuba, although  socialist,  are included  in their
respective  regions.
GINI : Gini  coefficient  of disposable  income  (for OECD  and socialist  economies);  Gini  coefficient  of gross income
for Africa,  Asia  and Latin  America.  Gini coefficients  are expressed  in percent.
STATE:  Share  of state sector  workers (general  government  and state-owned  enterprises)  in total labor  force.
TRANS: Share  of cash  and in-kind  social  transfers  in GDP, in percent.
RATIO  : Ratio  of per capita  income  between  the richest  and  the poorest  administrative  unit (province,  republic,  state)
within  a country.
INCOME  : Purchasing  power  GDP  in international  dollars  for 1988.
Number:  Number  of countries  included.
13The relationship  between RATIO  and other explanatory  variables is of particular importance
because of the two possible  interpretations  of regional heterogeneity  mentioned  above. In order
to include RATIO in our regressions we need to  satisfy two conditions. First, the correlation
between RLATIO  and GINI, while existent, should not be close to unity (as it would be if RATIO
and GINI were practically  the same variable); and second, the correlation coefficients  between
the other explanatory  variables  and RATIO  should  be small (ideally  close to zero) and in any case
smaller than the correlation between these explanatory  variables and GINI. Table 2 shows the
results. The correlation between RATIO and GINI is  -t0.54,  which is the weakest of any
explanatory  variable and GINI. This argues that RATIO is not a proxy for GINI. The correlation
between other explanatory  variables and GINI is always two to three times stronger than the
correlation between  the same explanatory  variable and RATIO, thus implying  that RATIO  is not
determined by  the same set of factors as GINI.  RATIO can therefore be included in  our
regressions.
Table 2. Testing RATIO:
Zero-order  correlation  coefricients
[_____________  STATE  TRANS  INCOME  GINI
RATIO  -0.20  -0.39  -0.39  +0.54
[  GIN!  -0.63  -0.73  -0.60  ____
Figures la-Id display  the relationship  between GINI and the four explanatory  variables.
We test first the "canonical"  equation given above. This is equation (1.0) displayed also in
Table 3.  The observations in all the regressions are arranged in ascending order according to
INCOME.
GINI = fct  [STATE, TRANS, RAT70, LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME)2].
All the coefficients  have the predicted  sign and are statistically  significant  at either 1 percent
14FI;ure  2a. Relationship between GINI and STATE
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Regression  is: GINI  - constant  +  B 0 l(INCOME)  r  1 InACOMD
18(STATE, TRANS, RATIO) or 5 percent level (inINCOME and squared InINCOME).' 2 The
intercept is not statistically  significantly  different from zero. This means that, for a sufficiently
low per  capita income (at  the  limit for INCOME=0)  and  in  the  absence of  state sector
employment  and transfers, the Gini coefficient  would be close to zero: i.e.,  no inequality  would
exist. The coefficient  of determination  is 0.76. The interpretation  of the results is as follows. Each
ten percentage  point increase  in the share of state sector workers reduces inequality,  on average,
by  2.09 Gini points; each increase in social transfers by  10 GDP percentage points lowers
inequality  by 3.8 Gini points; each increase in country's heterogeneity  by I (say, from 3 to 4)
increases inequality by 0.65 Gini points. Finally, the relationship between income level and
inequality  is quadratic: at first, inequality  rises with income and then declines. The turning point
is reached  for $2,100 per capita (at 1988  international  prices)  which is broadly  the level of income
of the Philippines,  Swaziland,  or Sri Lanka.' 3
There are two potential  problems  with equation (1.0). The first is that of heteroskedasticity.
It was observed  in the literature (see Lindert  and Williamson  1985, p. 344; Lecaillon  et al., 1984,
p.40) that the dispersion of the Gini is greater at low than at high income levels. One can
therefore  expect  some  heteroskedasticity  because  standard  errors would systematically  decline  with
increase  in income level. Indeed, this is exactly the case, as shown in Figure 2, where residuals
from equation (1.0) are plotted against  income levels. Regression  (1) is the same as (1.0) except
that I correct for heteroskedasticity  by running OLS with Whites' heteroskedastic-consistent
standard  errors. This does not affect  STATE, TRANS, or RATIO  but does affect  the two income
"2I  have experimented  with a number  of other formulations,  some  of them suggested  recently
by Anand and Kanbur (1993). The log-squared  gives the best results. This was the original
formulation  used by Ahluwalia  (1976).
13This is somewhat  higher than the turning point shown in Figure ld (about $1,800) where
GINI is a function of INCOME alone. Ahluwalia (1976) finds the turning point at $468 per
capita at 1970 prices and current exchange rates. On the basis of a somewhat  smaller sample,
Kaelble and Thomas (1991) find the turning points to  range, depending on the measure of
inequality used, between $322 and $489. Converting these values to  1988 prices and then
applying  the ratio between the purchasing  power  parity exchange  rate and the current exchange
rate from Summers and Heston (1991), we can express the turning points in 1988 purchasing
power GDP per capita (as in our sample).  Ahluwalia's value is then equivalent to $3 070, and
Kaelble  and Thomas's range turns out to be $2,175 and $3,176.
,''  19terms that become  statistically  significant  only at a 10 percent level (instead of 2-3 percent level
in regression  1.0). Since the same problem exists in all equations, all regressions  will henceforth
be run with the correction for heteroskedasticity.
The second problem is the role of RATIO. As indicated, we need to be sure that the model
is correct even if RATIO is left out. Thus, regression  (1A) is the same as (1) except for RATIO
which is now deleted.' 4 Omission of RATIO raises the coefficients and the significance  of all
the remaining  variables.  This produces  an important  effect  on both inccme terms which  now again
become statistically  significant at 2-3 percent level. The coefficients of STATE and TRANS
remain  stable. They  rise in absolute  amounts  but by relatively  little (e.g., STATE  rises from -0.21
to -0.22). The intercept  remains not significantly  different from zero. R 2 decreases  by very little,
from 0.76 to 0.71. We can therefore conclude that the omission of RATIO does not affect the
results except that it brings out the role of income more strongly.
Flgure 2. Residuals  from equation 1.0 as a function of INCOME
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Are our  results,  and  in  particular  the role  of STATE,  perhaps  driven by  the presence  of
"nTis notational rule will be followed throughout: equation number followed by A denotes
the same equation save for the elimination of RATIO.
20socialist  countries and their high share of state-sector  employment?  Regression  (2) is the same as
regression (1) except that all socialist countries (7 from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
Algeria, China, and Cuba) are dropped. The values of the coefficients  change but slightly: the
coefficient  of STATE becomes, in absolute terms, greater, rising from -0.21 to -0.32 (see also
Figure la where the regression  lir.e  becomes  steeper  when socialist  countries  are omitted)  and the
coefficient  of TRANS becomes smaller. Both income coefficients  increase and their statistical
significance  rises. R 2 decreases from 0.76 to 0.7. Overall, the inclusion  or exclusion  of socialist
countries makes little difference.
The steeper relationship  between STATE and GINI when socialist countries are omitted
requires an explanation.  It implies that decreases in inequality  recorded by socialist  countries are
small compared with the huge size of the state sector in their economies. Ind od, even from the
summary Table 1, it can be seen that while the difference in GINI between East European
countries  and (say) OECD  is only some 6 Gini points (or differently, inequality  in OECD  is about
a quarter greater than in Eastern Europe) employment  in the state sector is more than four times
greater in Eastern Europe. Therefore, when socialist countries are dropped from the sample a
given increase  in state sector share produces larger decreases in GINI.
Regression  (2A) is the same as (2) except for RATIO  which is omitted. No major differences
between the two regressions  exist except (as before)  that income terms are larger and statistically
more significant.
21Table  3. The Regressions:
80 countries; except equations (2) and (2A), 69 non-socialist countries only
Regr  Constant  STATE  TRANS  RATIO  INCOME  INCOME 2 DUMMY  EDUC  R 2 (F)  SE(DW)
1.0  -69.08  -0.209**  -0.381**  0.646**  31.21*  -2.036*  0.76  5.947
(0.22)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (46.5)  (1.95)
1  -69.08  -0.209**  -0.381**  0.646**  31.21  -2.036  0.76  5.947
(0.37)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.092)  (0-G64)  (46.5)  (1.95)
1A  -97.08  -0.223**  -0.416**  39.80*  -2.608*  0.71  6.449
(0.21)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.C35)  0.002)  146.4)  (1.99)
2  -84.72  -0.320**  -0 297**  0.652**  3--.35  -2.293*  0.70  6.242
(0.29)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.065)  (0.043)  (28.8)  (1.94)
2A  -113.2  -0.288**  -0.343**  44.  13*  -2.888*  0.64  6.779
(0.16)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.124)  (0.013)  (27.9)  (2.02)
3  -7 l.48  -0.182**  -0.386**  0.b42**  31.87  -2.084  -2.079  0.76  5.980
(0.36)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.086)  (0.059)  (0.650)  (38.4)  (1.94)
3A  -100.3  -0.185**  -0.423**  40.66*  -2.671 *  -2.949  0.71  6.479
(0.20)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.032)  (0.018)  (0.413)  (36.9)  (Q.98)
4  -48.99  -0.190**  -0.292**  0.672**  24.60  -1.449  -1.247**  0.78  5.680
(0.528)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.186)  (0.191)  (0.002)  (43.9)  (2.03)
4A  *79.71  -0.206**  -0.336**  34.06  -2.092  -1.144**  0.73  6.259
(0.309)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.072)  (0.064)  (0.013)  (40.6)  (2.06)
.1
5  -91  1  -0.230**  -0.512**  0.498**  37.22*  -2.376*  -7.128**  0.81  5.306
(0.165)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (52.1)  (1.82)
5A  -115.1  -0.244**  -0.558**  44.47**  -2.849**  -8.199**  0.78  5.625
(0.076)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (53.8)  (1.93)
22Notes to Table 3: Values in parenthesis are the complements of the level of confidence with which the null hypothesis
is rejected. Two (one) astensks indicate that coefficient  is significantly  different from zero at less than 1 (5) percent level.
Variable INCOME is In (purchasing power per capita GDP). Variable INCOME' is INCOME squared. In regressions (3)
and (3A), DUMMY variable takes va!t  1 for socialist countries, zero for others; in regressions (5) and (5A), DUMMY
variable takes value I for Asian coumtIies, zero for others.
Another issue is whether our STATE variable really adds something to the common practice
of using a dummy variable for socialist countries in income distribution studies. We argued above
that STATE is more general because it covers the whole spectrnm of values from 0 to 103, and
thus differentiates also between various capitalist (or even socialist) countries. In regressions (3)
and (3A) I introduce both STATE and a socialist dummy variable (otherwise the regressions are
the same as  1 and  1A). The equation is therefore
GINI = fct  [STATE, SOCIALIST  DUMMY,  TRANS,  RAT70,  LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME)J.
The  regression  coefficients  are  practically  unchanged.  Only  the  coefficient  of  STATE
decreases somewhat (from -0.21 to -0.18) but remains highly significant. We can safely reject the
hypothesis that the dummy variable is statistically significant in the presence of STATE.
Is Asia Different?
From Figure 3a,  which displays residuals from regression  (1), it emerges that in the case of
Asian countries  the actual level  of  inequality is  often smaller  than the predicted.  Out of  five
countries whose actual inequality is more than 10 Gini points  less (about one-and-half standard
deviations less) than tie  predicted inequality, four are Asian (Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Korea
and Taiwan)."  Also,  out  of  17 Asian countries  (the dots  in the Figures),  in  only  four is the
actual inequality higher than the predicted inequality. Differently,  in African and Latin American
economies inequality seems to deviate upward from the predicted values.
"The only other one is Ghana.
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'-1  *0Several possible explanations for the contrast between Asia and other continents can be
adduced. For example, more equal distribution  of physical and human  capital in Asian countries
may result in lower market (pre-government  involvement)  inequality. Then, even if transfers  are
small, inequality in disposable  income (i.e., after transfers and taxes) will be less than in the
countries in which the underlying market distribution  of income is skewed. Take, for example,
Taiwan and Uruguay, both probably the most highly educated and among the most developed
countries in their respective regions. The per capita GDPs of these countries are very close
($6,500 for Taiwan and $5,800 for Uruguay). Uruguay's share of state sector workers is twice
as high as Taiwan's (21 vs. 10 percent), and social transfers  are greater (10.5 percent of GDP vs.
8.1 percent). Yet Taiwan's Gini coefficient  is 32 and Uruguay's is 42. But the average number
of years of education  completed  by the population  over 25 years of age, is 9.2 years for Taiwan
and 7.8 years for Uruguay. The high premium  placed on education  in Taiwan is also reflected  in
the structure of social transfers: while tota; social transfers, in terms of GDP, are smaller in
Taiwan, public  education  expenditures  are three times as high: 4.6 percent of GDP in Taiwan  and
1.5 percent in  Uruguay. Another indicator of the high dispersal of assets in Taiwan is the
proportion of stock-owning  population, which at 27 percent is twice as large as in most West
European countries  and about the same as in the United States.
One possibie  explanation  of the lower (than predicted) inequality in Asia may lie then in a
more equal distribution of physical and human capital. The former is extremely difficult to
approximate;  the latter can be approximated  by the spread and depth of education.  I introduce  the
average  number of school  years completed  by the population  25 years of age or older (EDUC).1
The equation (4) is therefore
GINI =  fct  [STATE, TRANS, RATIO, LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME) 2,  EDUCI.
However, because of the strong collinearity  between education  and income, no new insight
is obtained. These two variables can be used practically as substitutes. The introduction of
education renders both INCOME terms statistically  insignificant  (see regression 4). Moreover,
EDUC does not reduce the downward  deviation  of GINI observed  in Asian countries (not shown
n 6The data come from the United Nations  Development  Program (1992).
25here). The omission of RATIO (regression 4A),  as in  earlier regressions, increases all  the
coefficients  and raises the statistical significance  of both INCOME terms; however they still
remain statistically  insignificant  at a 5 percent level. Education, therefore, does not provide an
independent  explanation  (i.e., an explanation  that is different  from what is implied  by income)  for
the lower inequality in Asia.'7
We are left with the altemative  of introducing  a dummy  variable  for Asian countries  (equations
5 and 5A in Table 3). The equation  becomes
GINI  - fct  [ST, 1 TE,  TRANS,  RATIO,  LN(INCOME),  LN(INCOME9,  ASIA DUMMY].
This improves  the fit and eliminates  the systematic  negative  residuals for the Asian countries
(Figure 3b).  All the  coefficients, including those of  both INCOME terms,  are  statistically
significant  at less than 2 percent level. This is the first time that in the presence of RATIO both
IN  iCOME  terms are statistically  significant.  The dummy  variable has the expected negative sign
and is highly significant: Asian countries have, all other elements being the same, an income
inequality  that is some 7.1 Gini points less than that of non-Asian  countries." This, of course,
is not an entirely satisfactory  conclusion because we are unable to explain what real factors lie
behind the observed lower inequality  in Asia.
What Explains the Differences  in Inequality?
On the basis of  these results we can find the causes for the difference in the levels of
inequality  between the five groups of countries. OECD  countries  are  used as a yardstick  and the
difference in GINI between them and the other groups is explained  by the differences in social
choice variables (state sector employment  and transfers), "given," variables (income levels and
regional  heterogeneity),  and an 'Asian element' variable. I use regression  (5) for the c&culations.
" 7Different  formulations  using  INCOME  and EDUC  were tried; none dispenses  with the need
for a dummy variable.
"As usual, the exclusion  of RATIO  in equation SA does not affect our results.
26The results are displayed in Table 4.
Table 4. Factors explaining the difference in inequality
compared to OECD countries (in Gini points)
Due to:  Socialist  Africa  Asia  LAC
State sector  -15.8  +2.3  +2.0  +0.4
Size of transfers  +2.8  +8.7  +8.1  +7.7
The Asia dummy  -7.1
Social  choie  1  -13.0  +1  L30:  j
Regional  inequality  r0.3  +1.5  +0.8  +2.6
Income level  +4.1  +5.8  +5.1  +5.5
"Giv-a  hfactors  +4.4  _  7  _  3
Unexplained  +2.2  +2.8  +0.9  +1.8
A7  ua  i-6.4  +2.  +.S 
Note: Calculated  from regression  (5) in Table  3. Negative  sign indicates  that a given element  reduces  inequality  in
the region  in comparison  with  inequality  in OECD  countries.
In the case of Latin America, Asia and Africa, the main causes of greater inequality, in
comparison with OECD countries, are lower transfers (which explain between 7.7 and 8.7
additional Gini points) and lower income (which explains between 5.1 and 5.8 additional Gini
points). These two elements alone would make inequality in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
some 13 to 14 Gini points greater than in OECD. It is interesting to observe that despite other
differences  Africa and Latin  America  display  very similar  patterns in the ex.-ination of inequality.
Asia, however, is  different  because the Asia dummy variable lowers inequality  from the levels
predicted  by the four general variables by about 7 Gini points. We also conclude  that the existing
lower state sector employment  and greater regional heterogeneity  do not alone produce much
greater inequality  in the three continents  compared  to the OECD  countries. Because  of lower state
sector employment, the Gini coefficient  in Africa and Asia would be greater by about 2 points,
and by only 0.4 Gini points in Latin America. Greater regional heterogeneity  similar!y  adds only
between  2.6 and less than 1 Gini points (the latter in Asia) to inequality. These are all very small
27differences.
In the case of Eastern Europe, by far the most important factor explaining  lower inequality
than in the OECD countries is the greater share of state sector workers: this lowers the Gini
coefficient  by 15.8 points on average. All other elements  point to a greater inequality  in Eastern
Europe than in OECD but their impact is not sufficient to offset the impact of the large state
sector. The debate about the lower income inequality in socialist  economies (Ahluwalia 1976,
Morrison 1984) can now be placed within a larger context of  factors which explain income
inequality  in general. Socialist economies  display lower inequality owing to the key feature of
their system:  the high share of state sector  employment.  This tendency  is partly offset by capitalist
countries'  higher social transfers and  higher income levels.  Regional heterogeneity plays
practically  no role.
An important  distinction to be made is between the effect of social choice and of 'given'
variables. If income level and regional heterogeneity  were the same in Africa and Latin America
as in OECD, inequality  would still be greater on two these continents  by 8.1 (Latin America)  and
11 (Africa) Gini points.  In consequence,  social choice elements -- principally  transfers -- seem
the chief "explanators"  of greater inequality  in Africa and Latin America. The Asian situation  is
different  because of the ambiguity of the "Asian variable": if it is a social choice variable, as it
is logical  to assume, then the difference  between the importance  of social choice elements  in the
OECD  countries  and in Asia is very small. However, while in the OECD  countries social choice
operates  through  high transfers and state-sector  employment,  in Asia, social choice  takes the form
of relatively equal asset endowments (presumably captured by  the dummy variable). If this
interpretation  is correct, then Asian countries  can afford to have low transfers since other factors
(e.g., even distribution of assets) produce relatively equal distribution of original income (pre-
government  redistribution).  Overall, the greater income inequality  in Asia -- compared with that
in OECD countries  -- is explained primarily  by the difference  in income level.
In conclusion, how do we explain the higher inequality  in less developed  countries and the
lower inequality in  Eastern Europe, compared to  OECD? For  Africa and Latin America,
inequality  is higher because of lower social transfers and lower income; for Asia, inequality  is
28higher only because of lower income; and for Eastern Europe, inequality  is lower because  of the
high share of the state sector.
How Important Are Social Factors?
Our next  question is: What is the importance  of social factors  compared with "given"  factors?
This is an important  question because  it is only after we empirically  know the relative importance
of social factors that we can make a judgment about the extent to which the standard Kuznets
hypothesis  needs to be modified. If social  choice  variables  reduce income inequality  by only a few
Gini points, then the general validity of the standard Kuznets hypothesis cannot be seriously
questioned.  Societies  can at the margin tamper with income  distribution,  but it is overwhelmingly
determined  by the factors that they cannot influence  in the short-run, and in particular by their
level of income.  Differently, if social choice  variables  lower income inequality  significantly,  then
the standard  Kuznets' hypothesis  needs to be substantially  altered. This would mean that societies
can affect income distribution:  the economic  determinism  implicit  in the standard formulation  of
the Kuznets' hypothesis  is then seriously weakened.
The solid line in Figure 4 shows the calculated  Gini coefficients  that are solely the result of
"given" factors: the line shows income inequality  that would obtain if only income and regional
heterogeneity  determined  inequality.' 9 An upward and short bulge in inequality is followed by
a prolonged and slow decrease in inequality as income levels rise. The Figure also shows that,
if "givens" alone mattered, the differences  in inequality  between rich and poor countries would
be relatively small. While the standard deviation  of the actual GINI in our sample is 11.7, the
standard deviation  of the thus calculated  GINI is only 4.1 (see Table 5).
'9The  calculation  is made  by using the coefficients  from regression  5 for income and regional
heterogeneity,  and setting transfers and state sector employment=0.
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The distance  between the solid line (the "given" Gini) in Figure 4 and the actual Gini points
is due, save for the statistical discrepancy, to the role of social choice variables. The distance
widens around $6,000 per capita. For all countries with higher incomes (except for Hong Kong),
the divergence,  and hence the role of social factors, is substantial.  One can therefore  propose two
tuming points of inequality:  the first would  occur at the level of approximately  $2,  100 where, as
noted  before, the standard  Kuznets' curve linking  income  and GINI  begins to turn downward.  The
second occurs at around $6,000  when social  choice variables  become  significantly  more important
than before and reinforce the downward  trend in inequality.
/  30Table  5. The  role of social choice  variables
Level of  (1)  (2)  Effect of  Due to:  Due to:
income ($  "Given"  Actual  social  STATE  TRANS
PPP)  GINI  GINI  choice:(2)-(1)
Less 1500  56.0  50.7  -5.3  -1.9  -2.3
1500-3000  56.8  46.0  -9.2  -3.7  -2.9
3000-4500  57.1  46.2  -10.9  -5.9  -4.5
4500-6000  55.4  41.2  -14.2  -8.6  -5.7
6000-10,000  52.6  29.8  -22.8  -10.2  -8.6
Over 10,000  48.8  31.4  -17.4  -5.8  -11.0
Total  53.9  40.7  -13.2  -5.5  -6.2
Standard  4.1  11.7
deviation
Sotes:
Given'  GMN: Calculated from re-ression (5) by setting STATE and TRANS-O.
Effect of STATE and TRANS: Calculated from regression (5) by multiplying the corresponding coefficients with the
actual values of STATE and TRANS. All of the difference in column (3) is not explained by STATE and TRANS. Some
of it is explained by the Asia dummy and some is unexplained because of the discrepancy between the values predicted
by the regression and the actual GINs.
All values a-e unweighted averages.
The difference  between the unweighted  "given" Gini and the actual Gini in the whole sample
amounts to 13.2 Gini points (Table 5). This is, therefore, the joint effect of social transfers and
state sector employment:  a reduction  of the Gini coefficient  from almost  54 to 41. How important
is this effect? How big is it in practical terms? It is equivalent to transforming Bolivia or Cote
d'Ivoire (both with actual Ginis of about 54) into Sri Lanka or Uruguay (Ginis of 41). The 13.2
Gini point reduction is almost evenly shared between the effect of state sector employment  and
social transfers: state employment  reduces  inequality, on average, by 5.5, and social transfers by
6.2, points.
The effect of the social choice variables is not independent  of the level of income. At low
levels  of income,  less than $1,500 at purchasing  parity, the "given' and actual Gini differ by very
31little: by about 5 Gini points with STATE and TRANS being of about the same importance  in
reducing inequality. Between $1,500 and $4,500, social choice variables reduce inequality  by
some 10 Gini points. The state sector now becomes  more important  than transfers. After $4,500,
the importance  of social choice  variables  further  increases, reducing  the "given"  GINI by between
15  and 20 Gini points or, put differently, cutting  the level of inequality  by more than a third. The
importance  of STATE remains greater than that of TRANS reaching its peak for the countries
with incomes between $6,000 and $10,000 where almost all socialist countries are located.
Finally, for the richest countries, the reduction in inequality, equal to  17.4 Gini points, owes
much more to transfers than to state sector employment.
Two conclusions can be drawn. First,  variables which represent social choice have an
important  role in determining  the degree  of inequality.  On average, social choice  variables  reduce
the unweighted  Gini coefficient  in our sample  by some 13 Gini points (i.e., by a quarter). Second,
the importance  of social choice variables increases  with level of income. Social  choice variables
do not matter very much at low levels of inco ie, but as income rises, society's preference for
policies  that reduce inequality  seems  to increase. Equality  seems  to be a superior  good. The strong
fermulation of the Kuznets hypothesis is  therefore less valid as income increases and non-
economic  factors -- compared with strictly economic factors -- become more important in shaping
personal income distribution.
325. Conclusions  and Implcation of the Findings
We have set out to answer two questions.  First, do social choice variables -- jointly with the
purely econiomic  variables included in the standard formulation  of the Kuznets' hypothesis -
determine income inequality?  The answer to this question is Yes. We have found that social
choice variables (social transfers and state sector employment)  uniformly, in all formulations  of
the regressions, show a statistically  significant  negative impact  on inequality.
The second question  is, how important is the effect of social  choice variables?  Here we have
found that, for the sample of  80 countries in the  1980s, the social choice variables reduce
inequality  by some 13 Gini points. Actual inequality  is, on average, only about three-quarters  of
what it would be if social variables were not operative. But this relation is not uniform with
respect to income level. At a low level of income, the role of social choice variables is almost
negligible.  As income  rises, their importance  becomes  greater. This finding  cannot be interpreted
by arguing that, at a low level of income, social choice has no role to play because there is
nothing to redistribute as everyone is poor. This is patently not true because at low levels of
income inequality is relatively high. 2"  Thus,  social choice variables could, a  priori, play a
significant  role even at low income levels. Why they do not do so can only be conjectured  now.
My hypothesis  is that society's preferences  change in the process of development  and that people,
as average income rises, tend to place greater emphasis  on equality. The preference for social
equality  is therefore income-elastic.  But, whatever the cause for the increasing  role of the social
choice  variables, the implication  of our results is that the validity  of the strong  formulation  of the
Kuznets' hypothesis  diminishes  as society develops.  The level of inequality  that a society charts
in its development diverges increasingly downward from the level predicted by the Kuznets'
curve. The discrepancy  is therefore systematic.  This is so because inequality in richer societies
does not decrease because  of economic  factors, but also because societies  choose  less inequality.
IOAt  some  possibly  mythical  extremely low level of income everyone  would  be equally  poor.
But this is not true at the actual low levels of income which we observe in our sample.
//  33We also find that Asian countries, once  all these elements  are taken into account, tend to have
a lower than predicted  inequality.  The difference  amounts  to some 7 Gini points. Further research
may be needed to find out just what accounts for the lower inequality. One hypothesis  has been
that the distribution of physical and human capital may be more equal in Asian countries -- for
a given level of income -- than elsewhere. If this is the case, then government  redistribution  via
transfers and taxes need not be as extensive in Asia as in other regions with more unequal
personal distribution of assets. Equal distribution of assets, if confirmed, may be that missing
"social choice" variable that not only explains lower inequality in Asia (compared to what "it
should  be") but provides  a potential  clue for high growth rates recorded  by some Asian  countries.
Recent literature on the link between economic  growth and political  economy  (e.g., Alesina and
Rodrik 1991;  Perotti, 1991  and 1992;  Persson  and Tabellini 1992)  argues that the size of transfers
is determined  by the political process, in short, by the gain that the median voter expects from
redistribution. Thus the population  in countries in which assets are highly unequally distributed
and in which, consequently,  inequality  in original  income is high, will have  an interest to vote for
large social transfers. To the extent that transfers reduce the incentive  to accumulate wealth and
to work hard, either economic  growth will be slow or democracy  will be impossible to achieve.
The dilemma, familiar from the 19th century  Europe, was eloquently  summarized  by the Spanish
statesman Canovas  del Castillo: rebutting  those who complained  about electoral fraud, he wrote:
'To have I o  choose between the permanent falsification  of universal suffrage  and its abolition is
not to have to ^hoose  between universal  suffrage  and preservation  of property" (quoted in Ubieto
et al.,  1972, p.  731). But if a country's assets are relatively widely distributed and market-
generated inequality is moderate, then large, particularly cash, transfers are not needed. Fast
growth  becomes  compatible  with democracy  (as the median  voter  does not have an interest to vote
for high taxes) and relatively equal distribution  of income.
Our "augmented  Kuzrets" hypothesis  cam  also be considered  in a historical  continuum.  Pareto
was the first economist who studied  personal income distribution. On the basis of his empirical
research, he was led to formulate  the "iron rule of inequality."2'  Pareto held that, whatever the
21 Pareto's  law of income distribution  appears for the first time in print in 1896. The sample
contains seven countries or cities. The next year Pareto (1897) published  his famous article in
34social system, level of deveiopment,  or type of elite in power, size income distribution  had the
same shape: only different people may be rich in one system (say, owners of capital) than in
another system (for example, party bureaucrats or  lana-owners). After numerous disputes,
Pareto's "iron law" was generally  rejected. The most favorable conclusion  that can be made is
that the upper tail of income  distribution  (top 1 to 2 percent of recipients)  tends to display features
observed by Pareto and embodied  in the density function bearing his name. The second general
theory of income distribution  was propounded  by Kuznets (1955). The unmovable  "iron law" of
income distribution  took the form of an economic  "iron law," whereby size income distribution
changes  with development  but does so in a predictable  way and shaped by economic  factors. The
forces that determine  the distribution  of personal income,  although  knowable,  are not alteiable by
human  design (unless, of course, a society  decides  not to "develop"). This is so because the level
of inequality is chiefly determined  by economic factors: by the level of development  and the
attendant  scarcity  and the concentration  among  the individuals  of various grades of skills, capital
and land. The hypothesis advanced here mitigates the economic determinism implicit in  the
standard formulation  of the Kuznets' hypothesis. 22 Size income distribution is determined also
by social choices. Societies  can choose, within limits imposed by the "objective"  circumstances,
whether they want to have a more or a less equal income distribution. And they tend to choose
less inequality  as they grow richer.
which his original sample  is extended  by a further ten countries. See Creedy (1985, p.22).
22Kuznets  himself was aware of the role of social factors. See the quotation  above.
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/  39Aman  Tae  1. State sector  employmrm  as perntage  of bhar fote  or seo  r  cotneiy  active  popudtieo
COUN1RY  STATE  YEAR a/  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
SECTOR  date  ector  employment  (all enployed)
EMPLOY.
OECD
Australia  29.3  1986  governmend  +  SOEA  (alI=labor  force)  Australia satistical yearbook  19S9  (p.171)
Austria  37.9  Avg75-SO(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies,  Spring  1915, No.4
._______________  Avg7S-79(S)
delgium  22.5  Avg75-tO(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies,  Spring 1985,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Canad  24.1  Avg75-80(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies.  Spring 19S5,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Denmttrk  9.4  Avg75-80(G)  idem  OECD Econonmic  Studies,  Spring 19S5,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)  _
Fusland  2S.7  19S9  public  ector: productive +  non-productive  Fmnband  scUtistical  yearbook  1991- .361)
_________________  (all  labor  force)
France  21.2  1984  government  + S0ESs  +  health, education  and  France  saatistical yearbook 19SS
welfare (alllabor  force)
W.  Gennany  22.3  Avg75-S-(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studier. Spring 1985,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Greece  10.7  1986-87  except  general  govt + health and  education,  Iransport  Greece  statistical  yearbook  1988;  Rutkowska  (1991)
govt 1975  and  telecom  workers  (all=econ.  active popul.)
Ireland  19.6  Avg75-SO(G)  idem  OECD Economkic  Studies.  Spring 1915,  No.4
Avg7S-79(S)
Italy  20.9  Avg75-SO(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies,  Spring 1985.  No.4
___________  Avg75-79(S)
Japan  9.5  1986  SOEs + public health and  educalion (a  l=labor  Japan  statistical  abtract  1991
force)  _
Netherlands  I 5.0  1987  public sector:  productive +  non-productive  Netherands  statistical  yeagbook  1981  (pp. 133, 140)
(all  labor  force)
New 7etuad  24.7  Avg75-80(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies  Spring 1985,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Norway  24.8  Avg75-80(G)  idem  OECD Economnic  Studics  Spring 1935,  No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Portugal  14.2  19S1  general  govt + SOEs  OECD Economic  Studies,  Spring 1915,  No.4; Portugal statistical  yearbook
1982  (pp.41,62)
Spain  13.7  19S2  general  govt  OECD Econonic Studies,  Spring  9115,  No.4
40COUNTRY  STATE  YEAR .1  COMPONENTS  SOURCfS
SECTOR  tate sector enployment (all employed)
EMPLOY.
Sweden  36.2  Avg75-80(G)  idem  OECD Economic  Studies,  Spring  19S5. No.4
Avg75-79(S)
Switzeritand  10.4  1982  general  govt (all=labor  forxe)  OECD Economic  Studies, Spring 1915.  No.4
Turkey  13.6  1990  govt +  SOEs  (ail=emaployed)  World Bank  Turkey Data Base
United Kingdom  22.S  1919  general  govt +  SOEs (&II=  labor force)  UK Cenmral  Statistical  Office, Social  Trends No-21 (1991)
United Stes  5.1  1985  govt employment  (all=lahor  force)  Esping-Anderwen(1990;  p.202)
Eastn  Europe
Bulgaria  91.5  1918  acisliat  sector  (all =labor  force)  World Bank Country  Study, Bulgaria:  Crias  and  Transition  to a Market
Economy  (1991, p. 331).
Czechoslovakia  91.3  19S9  Mate  sector +  cooperatives  (all= labor fomce)  Czechoslovakia  statistical  yearbook 1990  (p 19S)
Hungart  93.9  1981  state sector +  cooperatives  (all=labor fomce)  Hungary statistical  yearbook 19S  (pp. 66-67)
Poland  70.4  1919  scialized  sctor  (all=  labor  force)  Poland  statistical  yearbook 1990  (p.93)
Rotania  95.2  1919  state scctor + cooperatives  (all= labor  force)  World Bank  Country Study, Ronsanis:  Tle  Challenge  of Transition  (1991,
pI).
Forner  Yugoslavia  71.9  1919  socialized  asctor  (all=labor  force)  Yugoslavia  statistical yearbook 1990
Former USSR  96.3  1111  staue  sctor  + cooperatives  (11= labor force)  Soviet Union sttistical  yearbook 1988  (p.33)
E. Gernmny  94.7  1987  state  sector + cooperatives  (all=labor  foce)  East  Germany  satistical yearbook 19S(p.  112)
Iem  indicates  that  dhe  conpoaenta  are  the sarne  as in the entry under Austnlia, i.e.  general  government  plus public  ector.
SOEs e-  ate-owned enterpries. 'These  are  public sector  enterpriesa  as defined in each  country.
eI Avg 75-10 (G) dewotes  the r  crige governient  employntr  (G) in the period 197S-S0;  Avg 75-79 (S) denotec  the  average  employment  in state-owned  eaterprises  or public sector  (S) in the  period 75-79.
41Amnt  Tabh  I  60.)
COUNTRY  STATE  YFAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
SECTOR  ae  setor  enpboyrnent  (all enployed)
EMPLOY.
Ah*a
Algenia  50.2  87  public  ctor (all-econ.active  pop.)  Algeris satiskal  yatrbook 1990  (p.47) and FAO production  yearbook  1987
Egpt  19.3  79  non-financial  public cal.+  gereral govtw(all1eon-activepop.)  Hellcr & Tait (1983, p.40) and FAO production  ycerbook 1987
Gabon  8.4  S9  govt +  SOEc (all-labor  force)  Cabon  Direction GCnkrsle  de I'Econonue  (1990, p.14), Wodd Bank  Social Indcaton of
Developamet  199  1-92  and  The  Word  Factbook  1992.  p. 128
Ghana  12.4  a5  govt +  SOEa  (all-labor  force)  Ghana  Quarterly Digt  of Statistics.  Septenmber  199,  p.
48 and  The World Factbook
.1992p.102
Cose d'lveire  11.3  36  publi  ector cnployces (all -econ-active pop.)  Cakulatcd fiom Appkton,  Collier &  Honrhell  (1990, pp. 7 and 22) and Marcel (1992.
_____________  ________  p.
94)
Kcnya  7.5  S0  non-fiancial  public enterprises  + general  govt (all-econ.  Heller & Tail (19S3,  p-40) and FAO production  yearbook  19S7
active pop.)
Madagascar  3.1  80  non-financial  public enterprises  + general  govt (all  econ.  Helkr & Tait (1983, p.40) and FAO productionyearbook  1987
ctive pop.)
Morocco  5.0  87  general govt (ll-econ.  active pop)  Morocco statistical  yearbook 19S9.  pp- 23. 367
Nigeria  3.3  77-84  federal, state local govt +  SOEs  (all=econ.  active  pop.)  Bienen  & Diejonioh  (1981. p. 107). FAO production  yearbook  1979 for
SOEt-UNDP  and  World Bank. African Developmert  Indicators, 1990.  p.262
Senegal  3.4  76  non-financial  public enterprisec  + gencral  govt (l U-econ.  Helkr  & Tait (1983, p.40) and FAO production  yearbooks
active pop.)
Siem  Lone  1.3  79  SOEs  (all-econactive  pop.)  Milanovic (1989,  p.  7)
South Africa  13.2  S5  SA transpoe + central govt + ptovincial and local authorities  South  Africa yearbook  1987-88  (p.752)
(all-econ.  active pop.)
Swaziland  7.5  S2  non-financial  public cterprisecs + general  govt (all-econ.  Heller & Tait (1983, p. 40) and FAO production  yeadmooks
active pop.)
Tanzania  6.0  78  non-financial  public entcrprisea  + general  govt (all-econ.  Heller & Tait (19S33  p. 40) and  FAO production  yearooks
active  pop.)
Zambia  13.2  so  non-financial  public enterprisecs  +  general  govt. (all=ccon.  Hclkr  & Tait (1933, p. 
40) and FAO production  ycaeoooka
active pop.)
Zinbabwe  15.2  24  govt +  SOEs  (all-labor  force)  Zimbabwe  saistical  yearbook 1987  (pp.50 80)
Asia An.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bangladesh  4.2  831/4  govt +  nationalizcd  centepriwes  (all=ecron.  active  pop.)  Bangladesh  yearbook  1986  (pp. 210, 229, 234) and FAO production  yearbook  1984
China  20.4  87  sate +  urban  coop  cmployces  (all  -ccaa.  active  pop.)  China  yearbook  19S8 (p.  153) and FAO  production  ycarbooL  1981
4?COUNTRY  STATE  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
SECTOR  state sector  employment  (all employed)
EMPLOY.
12.2  90  pubik administration + publik  ervices (all=employed)  Cyprua  economnic  and ocial indicators  (1991, p.25)
Cyprus  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Hongkong  7.9  90  civil service + public project employees  (all= labor force  incl.  Hongkong  annual  digcst 1991  (p.34) and Hongkong  Semi-annual  rport  (1,°91 p.67)
unemnployed)
lrel  27.1  37  public nd commercial etcvkes  cxcl. public enterpriacs;  Irael  sttistical  abstrct  1938  (pp. 332. 340)
(all-civilian labor  fowe)
Wnia  6.0  77  non-finatncial  public enterprisea  + general  govt. (all  fecon.  Heller & Tait (1983, p. 40) and FAO production  yea.books
active pop.)
Indonesia  5.1  90  civil  ervice exci public enterprises;  (all=age 10+)  Indonesia  aatistical yeaebook  1991  (p. 61. 66)
Iran  26.9  36  public aector (govi+SOEa) (all=econ. active pop.)  Iran statistical  yearbook 1989/90
Jordan  22.2  86  public sector (govt  + SOEs)  (all =dotnmeic  labor fome)  Jordan tatiatical yeatbook 1987.  pp. 57, 69
Korea S.  9.3  81  non-financial public enterprises + general  govt (all =econ.  Heller & Tait (19S3,  p. 40) and FAO production  yearbooks
active  pop.)
Malaysia  8.4  85  govt. employed  (all -labor  fotce)  World BDnk  Malaysia  report No. 8667-MA, p
39; World Bank Malaysia  report No
10758-MA. p.30
Pakistan  238  74n5  SOEs  (all-econ.  active popul.)  Milanovic (1989. p.1
7)
Phillippines  11.3  79  non-financial  pubik enterprises  +  general  govt (all  econ.  Heller & Tait (1933, p. 40) and FAO ptoduction yearbooks
activc  pop.)
Singapore  10.4  30  govt.  + nmjor public companies  (all= econ. active pop.)  Singapore  atistical yearbook 1933  (p. 64) and 1980-SI  (p.
45) and Pilbai  (1983, tabk
__________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~VI)
Sri Lanka  23.3  s0  non-financial  public enterpriees  +  general  govt. (all-econ.  Hcllkr & Tait (1933. p. 40) and FAO production  yearbooks
active pop.)
Taiwan  9.9  75  govt. emtployccs  (all =econ. active pop.)  Taiwan yearbook  of labor  sitics  1937  (p.33) and 19T7  (p.1I)
Thiland  6.2  33  govt. employees  (all =econ. active pop.)  World Bank  Tlhiland  repot  No. 9627-TH, p.69
Lodi  Ameeria
Argentina  15.2  SI  non-financial  public enterprises  + generl  govt. (all-econ.  Heller & Tail (1983, p.  40) and  FAO pgoduction  ytctootks
active  pop.)
Bahalma  18.6  7S  non-financial  public enterprises  + general  govt.  Heller & Tait (1983, p.40) and  ILO  yearoook  at labor statitcs  1985
(  D-cgmployed)
Boivia  18.3  39  public sector  (all -employed)  Psacharopouloet al. (199,  anmx 14)
Brzil  11.7  a  govt. -+ federal and pfovincial public enterprises  (ail-econ.  Berg  & Shirky  (1987, p.21); Paul  Singer (1939. p.il)  and  FAO ptoduction yeaebook
active pop.)  191 (p.26)
Chik  9 2  89spublic  wtor  (all -employed)  Pscharopouloet  al. (1992. ama  14)  ICOUNTRY  STATE  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
SECTOR  sate  ector empiloymer  (all employed)
EMPLOY.
Coloabbia  10.7  89  public sector  (all-employed)  Pacharopoulohei  dl.  (1992, annex 14)
Coma  Rica  16.9  S9  public  ecuor  (all- employed)  P scharopoulo  ct al.  (1992, annex  14)
Cuba  82.4  13  nate aector incl.  agriculture  (al  -employed)  Rudolph  (198S, p. 299)
Ecuador  23.7  82  govt.  +  comrnunity arvicke (all-labor  fore)  Hanratty  (1991. p.  256)
Guaternal  5.8  al  non-financial public eat.  + genemrl  govt (all  econactive  Heller & Tait (1983. p.40)  and FAO production yeadbooka
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~~~~~~~pop.)
Hondurms  9.6  89  public sector  (all-employed)  Psacharopoula  el al.  (1992, annex  14)
Janaics  11.0  91  goveunmea  employees (all-labor  force incl.  wif-employed)  Pxacharopouloaei  al.  (1992, anncx  14)
Mexko  21.4  85  public actor  incl. public  enerpriae  (ad-employed  inc.  self-  Glade (1990, p.41)
cmployed)
Panama  17.3  79  non-finsncial public ererpsries  + general govt (all-econ.  Helkr  & Tai. (1983. p.40)  and FAO production yearbook 1979
active pop.)
Pern  14.8  89  public  ector (all -employed)  Pracharopouloset  al.  (1992, annex  14)
Unauay  21 4  89  public secor  (all -employed)  Parcheropoulo  et al.  (1992. anex  14)
Venezuela  19.3  S9  public  sector (all-eniployed)  Pacharapoukoset  al. (1992. annex  14)
REFERENCES
Appktoa.  Simon,  Paul Collier and  P. Horuhell (1990),  'Gcnder, Education, and Employment in Cote d'lvoire',  Washington.  D C.: World Bank, SDA Working paper No. S.
Berg,  Elliot and Mary M. Shirley (1987),  'Divestiture  in Developing  Countrics',  World Bank Diacuraion Paper  No  I  ,  Washington,  D.C..  The World  Bank.
Bienen,  Henry and V.P.  Diejomanoh  (19S1),  nke  Poriacl  Econc  y ofllcome  Disrbibdon  in Mgeroa. New  York:  Holmes and Meier
Gabon  Direction Genrnia  de I'Economie  (1990),  'La  conjoncture gbonaise  i  mi-S9',  Ecomie  ct Finances,  vol.  10, January,  p.14.
Glade,  William E. ed. (1990), Privaozadon  ofPubic  Enterprises  in Lawn Amenca,  International Center  for Economic Growth,  Inaimut  of the Americas. Cenger for U.S.-Mexican Siudie-
Hanrauy,  Dennis M.,  (1991), Euador:  A Country Study, 3rd edition,  Washington, D.C.:  Foreign  Area Studies, The Anerican  Univeraity.
Heller, Peter  S. and Ala  A. Tait (1983),  Gowvnment  Enploynen:  and Pay: Some lnernaanaonal  Comparisons. Washington,  D.C.:  Interntional  Monetary Fund, October.
Esping-Aadcrsen,  Goga,  he Zhrec  WorUd of  Wey4arc  Socialism,  Princeton  Pndccton University Premr, 1990.
Marcel,  KB.  (1992),  'Reinatoursation  et Evolution de l'enploi  dana k  ecteur public ct pam-public cn CO&e  d'lvoir',  Afilque  e#  Develoapmen: AJWca  Dewlkamert,  No.l,  p.
9 3.
Milanovic,  Bmnko (1989), LiberUnzadon and Enserprrneunhip:  Dynamis  ofRerjma  hi Socdalism and Capiralimn, Amwonk, N.Y.:  M.E.  Shpe.
Pillhi, Philip Nalliab (19S3), Slr  Enirpree  in Singapor:  Legal  amporsance  & Devlom,ent.  Singapore:  Singapore University  Paes.(1992),
sudies  pmgrom, Repo  No.27,  Decearber.
Rndoipb, Jamne  D.(ed) (1985), Cuba: A Co.ay  Study,  3rd edition, Washington,  D.C.: Foreign Ama Studics,  The American  Univerity.
Rutkowska,  lmbebs  (1991),  'Public Transfcrs in Socialist and  Market Econonmics',  Research  Project Social Expcnditures  and  their  Disitibutionsl Impact in Eastcrn  Europe.  Pcper No  7, Washington,  D.C.:
Socialist Econoties Refom  Unit, World  Bank.
Singer Paul (1939), 'LA class  obrera  trenle  a l  cnisis  inflacionaria y  a denmocrstizncion  en Brasil',  Economla  de America Lain,  15-19:17.
45Anne  Table 2.  Social transfen  kas  and  in-kind)  - peentage  of CDr
COUNTRY  SOCLL  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
TRANSFERS
OECD
Australia  17.1  av. 190a  Includes  heahh +  educalion  +  cducalion  +  pcnsiona  +  family  Rutkowska  (1991)
allowances  +  sicknacanumtmily  aiowances + unemployment
benefita  +  welfarce.  unics  otheriwie indicated
Austria  27.9  &v.19U0h  Ruikowska  (1991)
Belgium  30.3  v. 19S0a  RuikowAk (1991)
Canada  215  19SS  OECD, Social Expenditures  1960-1990  (1985. Table I  p. 21)
Dennurk  33.3  19SN  OECD, Social Expenditurcs  1960-1990(19SS.  Table 1. p.21)
Finland  22.0  av. 1980c  Rulkowska  (1991)
Francc  31.0  av. 19S0  Ruikowska  (1991)
W. Ccrmany  25.7  *v. 1950e  Rutkowska (1991)
Grece  16.7  v. 19S0  Rutk'wska (1991)
Ireland  25.1  av. 19S0a  Rulkowska  (1991)
Italy  244  av. 1980  Rutkowska  (1991)
Japan  17.5  19S1  OECD, Social Expcndiurma  1960-1990  (1985. Table I, p.21)
Netherlands  31.1  av. 19S0s  Rulkowska  (1991)
New Zealand  19.6  19S1  OECD, Social Expenditures  1960-1990(19SS.  Table 1, p.21)
Norway  27.1  1981  OECD, Social Expenditures  1960-1990(1985,  Table 1. p.21)
Protugcl  17.1  av. 190a  Rutkowska  (1991)
Spain  11.1  av. 1  90S  Rulkowsks (1991)
Sweden  32.2  v. 1950s  Ruikowsk  (1991)
Switzerland  14.9  1979  OECD, Social Expenditure  1960-1990  (195,  Tabkc 1, p .21)
Turkey  7.3  av.19S0s  Rutkowska  (1991)
United Kingdom  19.  av.  19S0a  Rutkowaka  (1991)
United Statcs  17.  7v.  19S0c  Rutkowsks  (1991)
Eine  ____p__  __  __  _COUNTRY  SOCIAL  YEAR  COMPONE.NTS  SOURCES
TRANSFERS
Bulprie  17.9  av.1980  World Bank Country Study.  Bulgana:  Crisis and  Transition  to a Market Economy,
1991,  vol  2 (Tabkl  6.6, 9.3 and Appendix  Tablc 15). GDP from ibid, vol  I, p  :36.
Czechoskovkit  21.3  wv.19S0c  Ruikowska  (1991)
Hungary  9.9  _  v. 1980c  Rutkowska  (I991)
Poland  17.5  v. 1980e  Ruskowaka  (1991)
Romanis  11.7  av.  1980  pcntions, family allowcnces, sicknesa  and maternity  beneCfits,  World Bank  Country Study.  Romainia:  Human  Rsources and  the  Transition to Market
health and  education.  Economy, 1992  (Tabkl  3.1, 5.21. 4.25).
Forntr  Yugoslavia  I.-  av.1980s  Rulkowaka  (1991)
Former USSR  15.7  1985  Statistical  Offices of Austria, Poland  and  the USSR  (1989, pp.32-3)
E. Gernuny  20.2  1985  cash  benefits,  health and  education  Statittcal  pocketbook  (Or  die GDR 1938  (pp. 25. 108)
Aue  Table 2 (coal.)
COUNTRY  SOCIAL  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCE
TRANSFERS
Africa
AlgeFia  8.6  S6  heatkh,  pension,  ind.injury,  (anily and  holiday allowances  Algeria astistical  yeateook 1990  (p.l 13) and  IMF  Intemcational  linancial Statistics
2991  (P.191)
Egypt  7.7  tS  social insurance,  family benefits,  health, public assistace,  ILO,  The coat of social ecurity 19W86 (tabk  3); education  - World Bank WDR
education  1937
Gabon  2.3  a5  idem; cxcl. education  ILO, The cost  of social wecufity  19446  (tabbk  3)
Ghana  4.7  t'  social  aecurity, health, education  World Bank Ghana  report No. 9475-GH, p. 
0 2
Coke  d'lvoire  7.3  35  idem; education  (2984)  ILO, The coat of  social  aecnity  191446 (tabbk  3); educatio  - World Bank Word
Resoufeee  1992-93  (p.240)
Kenya  5.6  85  idem  MO. The cost of  ocial  curity 2984-56  (tabke  3); education - World Bank WDR
Madagascar  3.2  85  idem  LO, The cost of social  security 19-6  (table  3); and  World Bank Madagascar  mepott
No. 9101-MAO
Morocco  6.3  36  education  and beahh  Moniswo  (1991,  p. 1637)
Nigerc  1.02  35  Wen; education  (1975)  MAW,  The cost  of social  scrity  1916  (tabie  3); education - Bienn  A Diejnomsh
(19S1,  p.463; IMP  _ucmliial Fuuwcial  Statistcs 1991  (p.570)
47COUNTRY  SOCLAL  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCE
TRANSFERS
Senegal  6.1  a5  idem; educatior (I 914)  ILO, The coa of social  accurity 1914-6 (table  3); education  Wotid Bank World
Reources 1992-93  (p.240)
Sierr  Leon  S  .8  S5  social welfamr,  education,  health  UN, National accouns statitiks: Main Aggtcptes  tnd  Detailed  Tables, 1990.  pp.  1666-
67
South Af6ica  3.9  I6  social  ecurity, education,  hcalth  Moll (1991, p.79)
Swaziand  5.9  15  idem; education  (1987)  ILO, The cod of social  scurity  1984-6 (tabk 3); edt-srion =  Lketat  du mondc,
edition  1991Paris (p. 301).
Tanania  1.9  S5  idem; education  (1986)  ILO, The cod of social  security 1914-S6  (table  3); education  =  World Bank  WDR
1988
Zambia  6.9  85  idem; education  (19t6)  fLO,  The cog of social  scurity  1984-S6  (tablc 3); education =  World Bank WDR
Zimubbwe  12.2  84-5  education,  health and  social welfae  Zimbabwe  satisical  ycerbook 19t7
Asia
Bangladesb  1.1  85  idem; education  (19t6)  ILO, The cost of  ocial security 1984-66;  education = World  Bank  WDR  1tt8
China  12-0  BB  cash  social welfare,  cash  subsidies,  education  and  health  China statistical yearbook  1992  (pp. 31. 223, 799. 107) and 1989  (p.  151)
Cyprus  S1  86  idem; education  (1919)  ILO, The cost  of social ecurity  19U4-S6  (table  3); education  =  Cyprus econornic  and
social  indicators (1991)
Hongkonr  2.9  11  cash  & non-cash  social welfare  (excl.pcmsiona;),  health,  Chow (1915, p-73); }ongkong annual  digcst of sttistics  1990  (pp.  111, 122)
education
lael  22.1  S5  iderm  LO, The cost of social wccutisy  19U-86 (tabte  3); education  =  World Bank WDR
19t7
India  1.8  S  5  idem  ILO, The cost of cocial security 194-86 (table  3): education  =  World Bank WDR
1987
bdonesis  2.4  S5  idem  ILO.  The cost o  social  security 19U4-86  (table  3): education = World Bank WDR
1987
Irn  7.9  15  health, scial  security, cducation  IMF Govemrnseit  Fincncial  Statistics,  yearbook  1991  (pp. 321-2)
Jordar.  5.4  85-S6  health, social security,  education  Musallan (1990.  pp. 132-33;  also Annet A, Table IOAI); education = Wodd Bank
WDR 1917
Kora  S.  2.9  91  social scurity,  social  assistance  (budgel),  health  and edt  cation  World Bank  Korea Report  No. 10733-KO  (p. 16)
Malaysia  3.0  S5  idem; education  (1912)  MO, TIe  cost  of social  security 1984  6 (table  3); education  - World Bank WDR
1985
Pakitan  1.6  I5  ide  ULO, The cot  of social  security 191446 (table  3); education  - World Bank  tWDR
1917
Phillippinec  2.3  S5  idem  LO, The cost of socil  secuAy 191446 (table  3); education  - Word  Bank WDR
19S7
48SOCIAL  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCE
TRANSFERS
Singapore  18.3  85  idem  LO. Tlhe  coat  of scial  scuriy  1984-6 (table  3); education  =  Wordd  Bank WDR
1987
Sri Lanka  4.6  85  idem  11.0,  The cost  of  ocial  ecurty 19U4-86  (table  3); education  =  World Bank WDR
1937
Taiwan  8.d  85  social  sccurity, cducation,  science,  cultumr  Taiwan gatiuiical databook  1992  (pp. 25, 157)
Thailand  4.3  as  idcm  1lW  Thc cost of social  secunty  1984-86  (table  3); educaoon  Worid Bank WDR
1987
[Mi.  Amneca
Aignhina  7.6  85  ide  ILO, The cost of social  scurity  1984-86  (table  3); education = World  Bank WDR
1987
Babamas  1 2  a5  idem; excl.  education  ILO,  The cot  of social  sccurily 194-86 (table 3)
Bolioin  6  J  35  idem  1.0.  Thc cost of scial  security 191416 (tabk  3)); education  e  World Bank WDR
1987
Brazil  - 5.5  85  idem  ILO. The coot of social  sccurity 1984-86  (table  3); education  World Bank WDR
1987
Chile  19.1  83  social ecurity, education  C. Mesa-Lago  (1991. p.  19); educalion  World Bank  WDR 19U6
Coombina  2.0  35  idem; excl. education  ILO, Tbc cos of social  scurity  1984-86  (table  3)
Cosu Rica  12.2  S5  idem  1O1.  Thec  cost of social  security 19U4-U6  (table  3); education - Wodd Bank WDR
l587
Cuba  19.4  85  ide,m  (O.  The cost of scial  aecurity  194-6  (tabk 3); education - Cuba  uatistical
ycarbook 1988  (p.195)
Ecuador  68  85  s  deid1m  0  The cost of social security 19"46  (tabk 3); education  - World Bnk  WDAR
1987
Guatmrala  3.3  a5  idem; education  (1990)  IU0, Tbhc  cogt of scial  wcarily 1964486  (tabk  3); education - Wodd Bank WDR
1992
Honduras  3.1  as5  iem;  cxci. education  IO,  Tbe cog of social  ecurity 194466 (tab!e  3)
1amaics  5.5  55  denm  IL0,  Te  cod of scial  secutry 19U4-86  ~tble  3); Boyd (1938 pp- 6. 111); IMF
(1991. p.  458-9)
Mcxico  5.6  55  idem  MD, The coo of  mid  tecuit)  19U446  (table  3); education  - Wod  Bank WDR
1987
Panma  13.2  Ss  idem;  education  (1986)  RD.  Tbe costd  of  oial  socwily  1984-86  (tabk 3); education  - Wodd Bank  WDRt
1988
Pctu  3.4  35  ideag educatio  (1983)  IW.  Th  coat of social  sany  194U6  (tl  3); edscatioa  - Wodd Bank  WADR
1986
49COUNTRY  SOCIAL  YEAR  COMPONENIS  SOURCE
TRNFERS
UrupY  10.45  i5  idem[  1W. TMe  coat  of mocial  ecurity  191U46  (tudc  3); eduation  - Wodd Bank WDR
1937
Veceual  5.6  S5  idem  RD,  Tbc cost of social  secty  19U46  (table  3); educt  to  - World Bank  WDR
Mem  denotes  tbe  une  caapms  - ia the ctcdy under Egyp  Th  ue componenl ae  social insuece,  faily  benefits,  lhea  cam, social i_  e be  accaes  for public  ecor  employees  (if acpsute).  public
aseance  and education  expedture  AU items  except  educatio  me obtained  from ILO, The Corl of Social  Security. Education  expeadiures  ae obiaid  sepamtely mor oftcn fr,m  the Word Bank  World  Deverpsav
Nsp.e  (WR).  If educatio, data  do bc  mfcis, to  sam  yea  ath  eat of duh  dat,  dim  is foowd  by edarealon  6ara.
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50Annet Table 3. Within-ountry  rtgienal heterogeurSty
(ratio of incomnet  betwev  uost  devdoped and leAst  derdoped  regieo
COUNTRY  RATIO IN  YEAR  COMPONENTS  SOURCES
INCOMES
OECCD
Australia  1.24  19S7  income  of wage  eorners  per capita (all mates)  Australia  statistical yearbook  1989  (p. 734)
Austria  1.22  1990  median  gros  incotme  of employees  and  the  elf-enmployed  (9  Austtris  satisical  yeattbook  1991  (p. 144)
prov:nCes)
Belgium  1.38  1979  hoscehold  incone (II  regions)  van Weeren  and van Paag (1984. pp- 239-270.  Table 2)
Canada  1.53  1986  family incomne  (all provinces)  Canada  statistical  yearbook 1990  (Table  5.62, pg.S-
34)
Dennark  1.44  1979  houehold income  (23 regions)  an Weeren  and van Poaag  (1984, pp. 239-270,  Table 2)
Finland  1.49  19t6  individuas'  incomfe  (all provinces)  Finland  statistical  yearbook  1991  (Table  276, p.303)
France  1.39  1979  household  incone (9  megions)  van Weeren  and van Pruag  (1984, pp. 239-270,  Table 2)
W. Gertmany  1-62  1979  household  incone (10 lander and West Berlin)  van Weeren  and van Psag (1984.  pp. 239-270.  Table 2)
Greece  2.88  19S1/89  domiestic  use of electncal  energy per capita (10 regions)  Greece  satistical yearbook 1988  (Table 11:6,  p.17 and Table XI:I  l,  p.310)
Ireland  1.31  1981  vehicles  per capita (by county)  Ireand satistical abstrct, September  1986  (pp.27 and 327)
Italy  1.68  1979  household  inconme  ('0  regions)  van Weeren  and van Prhag  (1984, pp. 239-270,  Table 2)
Japan  3.32  1978  incomne  per capita  (all prcfectures)  Japan  satistical yearbook  1981-82  (Table 2, p.78)
Netherlands  1.31  1979  household  incone (I I  prmvinces)  vsn Weeren  and van Phng (1984, pp. 239-270,  Table 2)
New Zealand  1.66  1980  average  salary (by distnict)  New  Zealand, lncomnes&  lnconmeTqx 1979-80(Tsble  21, p.
3 2)
Norway  :.2S  1980  car  per capita  (by county)  Norway satistical  abstract  19S8  (Table 234. p. 17)
Portugal  3.14  1986  wsge bill  per 1000  persons  (by district anrd  autonomnous  region)  Portugal  iststuscal yearbook  1989  (Table 13.1.3, p. l8)
Spain  1.39  1985  incone per capita  (all regions)  Spain  statistical  yearbook  1990  (Table 1.4. p.
8 S6  and Table 1.5. p-8S
7)
Sweden  1.35  1988  income  per capita  (by Lounty)  Sweden  sttistical  yearbook  1991  (Table 225, p.213)
Switzerand  2.20  19tt  incone per capita  (all cantons)  Switzerland  statistical  yearbook  1992  (Table 4.2)
Turkey  4.06  19t6  GDP per capita  (by region)  World Bank Turkey data  bas (Tables 1 and Table 2)
United Kingons  1.16  1979  boushold income  (10 regionsa  van Weeren  and  van Psag (1984, pp. 239-270,  Table  2)
Urited States  2.07  1938  income  per capita  (all  autes)  US  statistical  abstract 1990  (Table  706, p.437)
51COUNTRY  RATIO IN  YEAR  COMPONENlS  SOURCES
INCOMES
Bulgria  1.35  193  tv per 1000  persona  (all counties)  Bulgaria  salistical yearbook  1989  (Table XIlw,  p. 502)
Czechoslovakit  1.09  1988  income  per capita  (2 republics)  Czechoslovakia  Federal  Statistical  Ofrce  (1990)
Hungary  1.24  1939  tv per 1000  persons  (all counthie)  Hungary satistical  yearbook  19S9-90  (Table 32.19, p-420)
Poland  1.47  1990  telephones  per 1000  persons  (all voivodships)  Poland  statistical yearbook  1991  (Table m, pp. LVI  -LVl)
Romania  2.56  1935  iv per capita  by counties  Romfniar4  atistical yearbook I986  (Tsble  I1,p.  13 andTable 221, p
3 3 7)
Formner  Yugoslavis  7.3  U  1981/9  income  per capita (S republics or autonomous  pmvinces)  Yugoslavia  statistical yearbook  1991  (Table 203-5 p.4
45 and Table 205-2, p.4
76)
Former  USSR  3.00  1390  income  per capita  (IS  republics)  Braithwaite  (1990, p-34)
E. Gersany  1.14  19S7  retail trade  per capita  (14 regions;  excl. ELast Berlin)  E. Germany  sttistical  yearbook 19SS  (pp. 1  and 651T)
Annex Table 3 (cowt.
COUNTR>-  RATIO  YEAR  VARIABLE  (break-down  by regi(.ns)  SOURCE
Africa
Algeria  1.43  79/10  per capita  expcnditure  (5 zones)  Algeria satistical yearbook  1990,  No. 14.  p 239
Egypt  1.31  s0  household  income  (2 tegions)  Mohie-Eldin  (1982, table 3.20)
Gabon  6.9  77  average  income  (urban vs. rural)  ILO (1933,  p.23)
Ghana  3 72  70  living standards  indicator (3 regions)  Boateng,  Ewusi, Ksnbur and McKay (1990, p.
29)
Cote d'lvoire  3.4  75  per capita nril  income  (asl regions)  IL)  (1982,  p.
4 7)
Kenya  23.2  76  per capita income  (S regions)  Bigaten  (197S,  p-40S)
Madagascar  2.7  S0  household  income  (12 regions  excluding  large cities)  Domosh,  Bcrnier Sarris (1990, p.
4?)
Nigeria  6.1  777n3  per capita income  (urban  vs. rural)  Jamal  (19  lp.  lS)
Momcco  4.2  3o  ownership  of care  per capita (7 areas)  Morocco sutistical yearbook  1939.  pp. 15,  219
Senegal  1.9  s0  per capita  rural  income  (all regions)  [LO (1932,  p.47)
Sierrn Leone  3.3  75r76  average  inconme  (urban vs. rural)  ILO (1983,  p.23)
South Africa  4.2  79  per capit  income  (whites/blacks)  Devereux  (19S3,  p.3S)
Swaziland  6.9  74  average  incone (urban vs. rural)  ILO (1933,  p.23)
Tanzania  1.2  78  'verage income  (non agricultural vs. farmer)  11  (19S2,  p.
4 9)
52COUNTRY  RATIO  YEAR  VARIABLE  (break-down  by region.)  SOURCE
Zanmbia  2.S  76  average  income  (urban vs. rural)  ILO (1983, p.23)
Zimbabwe  3.9  S3  taxable  inconme  per capita (4 regions)  Zimbabwe  abtistical yearbook  19S7  (Table 2.12. 7.14)
Asi
Bangladebh  3.19  79-80  per capita  income  (urban v.  rural)  Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics,  Socio-econonmic  indicators 19a  1, p. 1  13)
China PRC  7.7  S7  per capita income  (3 metropolitan  tman  and  26 provinces)  China  atistical yearbook  198S  (p.55)
Cyprus  1.0  regional  difference  non existant
Hongkng  I .0  regional  difference  non-existant
Israel  1.0  mrgional  difference  non-existant
India  1 69  74  consumer  expenditure  per capita  (24 states  and  territories)  India Depaitment  of Statistics  (197S,  pp.7-1
9, 70-S3)
Indonesia  6.94  S3  GDP per capita exciuding  oil-producing regions  (23 regions)  Hill and  Weidenann (19S9,  Table 1.  1)
Iran  6.35  76  percentage  of households  with electricity (urban vs. rural)  UN compendium  of social  development  indicators in ESCAP  (Economic  and Social
Commission  for Asia and  the Pacific) 19S9,  p.
6 9
Jordan  2.47  86  household  income  (10 regions)  Sha ban  (1990, p 6
7)
Korea S.  1.19  80  household  income  (urban vs. rural)  Sang-Mok  Suh (19S5,  p-1
0)
Malaysia  3.06  8O  per cpita  income  (14 regions)  World Bank Malaysia  report No. 8667-MA
Pakistan  4.83  SO  percentage  of households  with eleciricity (urban vs. ural)  UN comnpendium  of social  development  indicator  in ESCAP,  p  70
Plhillippines  3 26  71  average  family income  (10 regions)  Pemia  (1977,  p.7g)
Singapome  1.0  regional  difereoce  non-existant
Sri Lanka  5.74  Al  percentage  of households  with electricity (urban vs. rural) Hil  UN compendium  of social  development  indicatorm  in ESCAP,  p. 71
Taiwan  1.85  aS  household  income  (2 merrmpolitan  areas  and  21 counties)  Republic  of China (Taiwan) statistical  yearbook 1989  (pp.  I 
4-7)
Thailand  6.11  72  household  income  (5 rural regions  and 5 urban regions)  Chiswick  (1981, pA
6)
Latin  Amsesrca
Argentina  6.21  S5  GDP per capita  (22 regions)  World Bink county study, Argentina: Provincial Government  Finances  (1990, p.l
42)
8ahans  1  .9  90  household  income (5 islands)  Bahamas  statistical  abstract  1992
Bolivia  24.5  89  tax payments  per capita  (9 regions)  Bolivia statistical  yearbook  1989
Brazil  12.29  70  GNP per capita  (26 states)  UN ECLA, Distribucion  Regional  del Producto lntemo B8ito-Sectorial  en los Paises  de
America Latina  (1981, p.
2 6)
53COVNTRY  RATIO  YEAR  VARLABlE  (btak-down  by regions)  SOURCE
Chsilb  4.92  76  GDP per  capita (24 regions)  UN ECLA, Diuribucioa Regional  del Psducto lbsrno Rnro-Sectoril en lot Poises  de Amnerica  LetitA (19t1, p.32)
Colombia  6.75  75  GDP per capita  (24 departntens)  UN ECLA.  Distribucioti Regional  del Psoducto  Ituerno Bnto-Sectorial en los Paises  de America LatisA (1911, p.30)
Cota  Rie  2.95  73  percentage  of urban population (7 regions)  lantzi (1976, p.28)
Cuba  1.14  S8  averfge wage  (IS  regions)  Cuba sttistical  yearbook  1988
Ecuador  3.12  I5  GDP per capita (16 provinces)  UN ECLA,  Distribucion  Regioral del Producto  Interno  Bruto-SectonIal  en loe Paises  de America Latina (1981, p.33) Guatenala  4.74  86/87  non-poor households  as percentage  of  1ll  households  (S  Pinto  et al  (1992,  p.80) regions)
Honduras  15.9  79  cars per capita  (18 departments)  llonduras satistical yearbeok  1979 (pp. 4. 131) lantaica  3.39  91  percentage  of population in receipt of por  trlief  (13 regions)  lamaics  economnic  and  social  survey 1991  (pp. 15.3, 23.4) Mexico  6.92  70  GOP per capita  (32 states)  UN ECLA, Distribucion  Regional  del Producto  Intemo Bruto-Sectorial  en los Pai es de America IAtins (1981, p.36)
Panama  3.76  68  GDP per capita (9 provinces)  UN ECLAA  Diatribucior Regional  del Producto  ptro  Bnjto-Sectorisl  en los Paiwe de
Peru  16.42  77  GDP per capita  (23 departments)  UN ECLA,  Disitribucion  Regional  del Producto  Intemo Bruto-Sectorial  en los Paise de America Laitina  (1981,  p.3t9) Uruguay  1.0  regional  difTerence  non-existant
Venenels  2.92  19  population with access  to sewage  (19 regions)  Venezuea  rstatiisical  yearbook  1989  (pp. 1
79. 648)
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55As  Table 4. The Gid  ieadims
Ci  i  Year  Components  Soumaes
COUje  coeffienA
OECD
Ausmfali  31.6  S1-12  D(pfYp)  Bidhop,  Fonrby,  Smith (1991, Table  3 & 4). US dats.
Autria  24.9  39  DONIYp,e);workers  houaehoda  Calculated  fiom Austria Statistical "eadaok 
19
90 (p 161)
Bdelgium  27.4  t3  D(bfY%b)  Veleduc  (1917, p.9
7)
Canada  320  51  D(pY*p)  Bishop, Formby, Smnith  (1991, Tables  3 & 4). US data.
Dem_rk  23.0  Estinated fiom Trakoglou (1992. p.27)
Finland  202  S5  D(pIYp*,c)  Ringen(1991)
France  30 7  Sl  D(p/Yp¶e)  Mitche  (1991, Table C3). US data.
WGernany  27.S  II  D(p/Y-p)  Bishop, Fomiby, Smith (1991. Tabice  3 & 4). US data.
Groece  39.9  86  D(hIYh); txabe  popul. only  Livada(1°,°,Tabl  1)
Ireand  34.6  t7  D(htY-h)  Calculted  from Imeand  Central StLtistical  Office (199).
kaly  31.3  90  D(h/Y)  Btndolini  (1992,  Table B12)
Japan  35.0  a5  D(hfYh)  Oshima  (1991, Figures I  & 2)
Netheranda  32.1  13  D(pfY*p)  Bishop, Fornby,  Smith (1991. Tabke 3 & 4). LIS data.
New Zealand  30.0  S5-S6  D(p/Yp,e)  Saunden, Stott. Hobbes  (1991,  Table 5, p175).  US data.
Norway  26.9  79  D(p-Y'p)  Bidh"p, Formby, Snuth (1991, Tables  3 & 4). US data.
Portugal  38.1  73-74  D(h/Yh)  Calculated  from Portugal  lntituto  Necional de Esatistica (1977,  p 16)
Spain  31.5  aS  D(hMYh)  Calculated  from Spain  biuituto  Nacionsl de Etatistica (1919, p.3t0)
Sweden  22.9  Sl  D(pIYp)  Bishop, Formby, Smith (1I99, Tables 3 & 4). US data.
Switzerand  35.5  32  D(pNYp)  Bishop, Formby, Smith (1991, Tables 3 & 4). US data.
Turkey  43.3  37  D(hY*b)  Cakulated from Turkey  tatistical yearbook  1990 (pp.  206-7) frnt  houaehold  budget survey
1987.
United KinSdom  2k.1  79  D(p/Yp)  Bishop, Formby,  Smith, (1,91, Tables 3 & 4). US data.
United States  34.4  79  D(pNYp)  Bishop, Formby, Smith, (1991,Tabks  3 &4).  LIS data.
Eastem E  pe  .
56Gini  Year  Coaponents  Sources
COadrMy  coefficiert
Idkgapt  21.7  9  ID(pY*p)  Cakulated from houwehold  budget  survey 1919.
Fotmtr  19.5  aS  D(pYIp)  Calculated  fram Czechoslovakia  Flderal Statistic.l Office (1989); houwehold  budgets.
Czecheblovakia
Hunpgry  23.1  39  D(pNYp)  Calculated  from household  survey 1938.
Poabnd  26.0  19  D(p/Y  p)  Calculated  trom Poland  Central Statistical  Office (1990); houwehold  budgets.
Roamnis  25.7  91  D(p/Y-p)  ole (1992, p.25)
Former  37.9  S9  D(pfY*p)  Calculated  fran  Yugoalevis  Federal  Statiatical  Ofrice (1990); household  budgets.
Yugoslavi
Former  USSR  2S.3  90  D(pNYp)  Cakulated from household  survey 1990.
EGermny  19.3  89  D(pfY*p,e)  Hauter, Mueller, Wagner  (no date, p.9)
Algeria  \  39.9  S9  Ahimd (1992)
Egypt  43.0  74-75  D()/YT)  Hanen (1992, p.
2 21)
Gabon  63.0  77  D(pyp)  RLo (1992)
Ghana  36.7  9849  D(p/F4)  Chen, Datt, Ravalliott (1993)
Cage  d'lvoire  54.0  35  D(pNYp.e)  Kozel (1990)
Kenya  57.3  1-U3  D(h/Yh)  Cben, Datn,  Revallion (1993)
Madagascar  41.9  11  0  DOM)  Pryor (1990,  p.26)
Morocco  53.3  So  D(pfYp)  Bourguignon,  Morritson (1989, p. 167)
Nigeria  60.0  73-74  Dfh/h)  Jamal  (1911)
Senegl  S .3  70  DQsYh)  Leceillon, Paulkert,  Morrison,  Gcrnidis (1984)
Sierra Leone  49.0  75-76  D(Ply)  1LO (1992)
South Aftica  57.0  s0  Devereux (1983,  p.
7 3)
Swaziland  S7.0  74  D(plyp)  ILO  (1992)
Tanzre  59.0  as  DQIEr)  Lins  Ferreire (personal  communication)
Zanbia  57.0  72-73  DQVyh)  Cakluated frim  Fry (1979, p.92)
2inihabus  50.1  70  D(h/yb)  MD  (1992)
57|  Gini  Year  Components  Sources
Cc"*y  coedficient
Axis
Bangladeim  35.0  U3  D(hfYh)  Oshinu (1991)
Chino  33.2  So  D(pIY'p)  Rcnci  (1992)
Cyr-"  35.7  4-5  D(hWYb)  Caculated from Chimtodoulou (1992, p.
225)
Hoe  o  4S.5  Sl  D(hb)  Orbina  (1991)
bisal  33.3  79  D(p/Yp.c)  O'Higins,  Schnuus, Stephcnson  (1989)
India  40.0  75-76  Dowling (1984. p.l
5)
Indonoa  51.0  77  D(w/Yw)  Rao (1939, p-59)
isa  42.9  84  Dth?F")  Bebdad (1929. p.3
27)
Jordan  39.7  *6  DO&lYb)  Shsaa  (1990. p.67)
S. Ko^M>"  35.7  S2  DWl')  Cboo(1991.p.S)
Malaysia  43.4  b9  D(pYp)  Chaen,  Dan, RavalCioa  (1993)
Pakimun  38.3  S4  D(  bM)  Ahmd  and Lulow  (19U3,  p.23)
Philippines  45.5  87  D/Yh)  Otmina (1991; Figures I & 2)
Singapon  41.0  87-8  D(bM)  Rao (1990. p.147)
S ilanka  43.0  I5  D(bNh)  Odhina (1991; Figures I  A 2)
Taiwarn  32.5  37  DQhIYa)  Orhima (1991; Figures I &  2)
Thailand  47.8  SS-t9  D(hYh)  Bh ngmkapat  (1990, p 166)
Argentins  47.6  89  D(p/Yp)  Pascharopou!s  et dI. (1992, annex 3)
Bahamas  42.5  S9  D(hlEh); mral only  Calculated  from the Commonwealth  of the Bahama (1992. p.1
02).
Bolivia  52.5  39  D(p/Yp)  Pscharnpouloaset  *I.  (1992, annex  3)
Brazil  63.3  X9  D(pfYp)  Pesacb  apoulaet  al*.  (1992,  annex  3)
Chile  4S.2  S7  D(pYp)  Caculaed  fn  lbindl,  Budinich. Irnnzaval  (1939,  pp. 47-9)
Cdonba1S.6  S7  DQWa)  Aamir  (19S4,  p. 266)
Co"e  Ric  46.0  89  D(pfYp)  Psachainpouloe  al  . (I992,  annex  3)
58Gini  Year  Comnponents  Source
Country  coefficient
Cuba  26.0  7S  D(pNYp)  Rodrigues  (1989, p.21
8)
Ecuador  445  S7  D(p/w)  Psacharopouloset  al. (1992, anriex  3)
Guatenla  59.5  89  D(pNYp)  Puacharmpouio  et al.  (1992, annex  3)
Hondur  s  59.1  S9  D(pNYp)  Psachsropouloset  al. (1992,  annex 3)
Janaice  44.5  75  D(h/Yh)  Boyd (198S,  p.  I00)
Mexico  50.6  U4  D(pNYp)  Pacharopouloset  al. (1992, annex 3)
Panama  56.5  S9  D(p/Yp)  Psacharopoulos  et al. (1992, annex 3)
Penu  57.0  81  D(hIYh)  BerFy  (1989, p.2
00)
Uruguay  42 4  89  D(p/Yp)  Psacharpouloat ami.  (1992, annex 3)
Venezuea  US44.  89  D(pNYp)  Psacharopouloses  al. (1992, annex 3)
Defin  ion ofcoumponea.. Diabristion  of (recipientsAype  of income per recipien) where recipentas  are p-peronsor  h-houweholds.  and incomne  is Ygroa  incofe.  Y-=dispouble  income  and e denote equivslized  income.  Thus D(p/Yp) indicates  dat  the  Gini coelliciert  is cakulated from the distribution  of perona ranked  by their per capita  gfios incone; or D(hIYh)  denotes  distribution  ofhouseholds  according  to total honawhold  dipoamble  income.  For Indonesia,  the recipients  are only wage-rnenr  and incorme  i  wage  income  (w) only; for Ecuador,  incone is approximated  by labor  income  (w), for the Bahamas,  Ghana,  Tanzania  and Iran, incomne  is approxigted  by expenditurs  (E).
REFERENCES
Abnad,  EJutisnam  (1992), 'Poveny,  Iequality  and Public Poliky in Tranaitioo Econonics', Public Finance, Supplement:  Public Finance  r at  World of Trnsdioe,  47196
Ahrnad, Ehtisham nd S. Ludlow (19U8), 'On Change&  in Inequality in Patiean:  1979-84',  The Developenrt ResearCh  Program, London Scbool  of Economica,  June, p. 23
Ahantir, Ocr  (I94),  'Poverty, Incom  Distribution and Chi.d Welfare in Latin Amerka: A Comparison  of Pre- and  Po t-Recestaon  Daw',  Wor  D,ewlopnen4 12:3.
The Co_nIonwealth of the Bahansa, Ssasdcal Absn'c  Repou, Departnedt of Statisicx, 1992,  p. 102.
Bebdad,  Sobrab  (1989), 'Winners and Lwens of the kanian  Revolution: A Study  in Income  Distibution,  IntenadoroJounWJ  of MidALe  Eat  Sidisa,  August.
Berry, A.  (19S9),  'Incoe  Disributrion and Foreign  Trde:  The Cae of Perm', Externl Trade and Income Distribution, OECD, Paris, p. 200.
Bhognukapat  Tecan  (1990)  'lrAmne  Distributio  in a Rapidly Growing Economy:  Th  Case  of Thailand', 9ngapor  Eeo  _onk  ReWne,  April, p.  166.
BiW  p,  lde  A., John Formby  ad  W. Jones  Smith (1991), 'hierational  Comparison  of loea  Inequality: Teas for Lorenz Dominance  acrts  Nie  Cauntrie',  Ecos'ossa, 5S,  pp. 461-7.
Bourguignon,  Franoia and Chrtian  Morriaao  (19S9), 'Incone  Distribution and Forcign Trade: The Cas  of Moncco',  in P. Bourguigon ad  Ch. Motisno  (eb),  riental  Trade and  Incoe Dkndhde,  Paris:  OECD.
59Boyd, Detek (19U), E&ono.c Mmigemen,  Income  Ddstibuuon  mwd Poway in Jamuaca,  New  York:Prweger,  p. 100.
Branlni.  Andita (1992), 'A Description  and an Aauasnet  of the Ssmple Surveys  on the Personal  Distibution of Incones in buy'.  drimeo,  August.
Cben, Shahnus,  OGurv  D3  and Mtis  RavalLo (1993O  , 'Ir Poventy  Inceasing in the Developins  Wodd?', tnimeo, April.
Cboo, Hankchug (1993), 'A  Comarimonof Incoan Disribution in Japan, Koea and  Taiwan in T. Moguchi  (ed.), Making  Ee  rmos  More Eidena  mad  Morc  Eqadrbk: Fcotn  Dcernedning
Income  Diaubuiu,  Econnie  reseach sefies No.  29, Tch btitue  of  Econonaic  Rcarch,  Hitotsbaysabi  University,  KunitAcha,  Tokyo and  Oxfxd: Kinokuniya  Conpapny  Lid. and Oxford  Univerity
PrM.
Chaidodoak  D., (1992), Ide  A.  C)pr  Mk,ue.  The  Labovs  of.n, Embil  MWi-Ec,nomI.  University  of Miaoa,  Minnso  Mediteunmn and  Eas European  Studies,  Vol. 2, p.225.
Czacbolwakis  Fedenl  Ssieal  Offic  (1990), M*bvcena  1991  .dll, Paue:  Fedeal  Statisil  Office.
D  nevex,  S_ag  (3913), -SqIl  Ahriean  lcome Diuibuon,  190040-,  SALDRU  Woring Paper No. 51, University  of Cape Town,  Agusd, p. 73.
Dowling,  EM. (9194).  Dietsih.sto. and Poer  iy  Sdected  A"n  Coustrie',  The Aun  Dvedopne  Bank,  Manila,  Noveuber, p.  15.
Fr,  ham  (I7,  Nw&aywu  ded Nome  Distri  n, hI At A)11cm  Economy,  Crooen  Hedm,  Londan, p.92.
11mi Eer  I.,  Em  Dadhice mod  _  w.e  nam vl  (19),  GiC  Soidl Fje,cve. Saio  de Chile: Ofeina de Plaificaeaon  Nacioal and Univeraidad  de Chile, Facuad de Cimeia Economicas
y  Ai-dy_.
Haes.,  D"d (1992),  Erp  mW T-rky:  Mm  P.Ua  Ecnmy  qfEEqdry  mEd  GamA, Wadkingo  D.C. and Oxford  UK: Word Bank  and Oxfd  Univ  y PNa.
Hasse,  Richard and KIU  Mul1  (no de),  'Ie  in East  and West Geany  o  h  Eve of Union:  Some Rchs  Bad  ond  he Gma  Socioeco  c Pael'.  n
Iw  (192),  hIuUrkme  GA  stud  f;  ca  D  bhRep  ofSeenarenfarm  C4mr,ies. Addis  Ababs:  DO.
balktd Cerd  Statidl  O0In  (1969),  BemeA  _  Audgeu  Smwy 1967, vol. 1,  Ccrl  Statilea  Office: Dublin.
Ja)a,  Vai (I13),  'Rural-Usbam  Gap  _td  haqnaal  is Nieri',  RD.  Addia  Ahaba,  Working  Papas, Selsenber.
Kind, VWe  (31990),  -M  Cn  yoabion ud Duitrlnidoof  1cm  in Came  divoie,  Wanbing,  D.C.: WoU  Dank, LSMS  Woking pa  No. 68, Mamc.
Lcaillon  Jaee,  Fdeli hlkat,  Chri_m  Miun.  Disai  Gertidi  (1934),  Ircm.e Diu,1budde  mad  Econmic Deelopmea.  GenevawLO.
Livbd,W  Alemxan (3993),  'heem  nequality  Gme:  A Statistical  and  Econoaeti  Analyasa',  Qr,r4d  Dultedn  ofFEcwdoelcz  med  SaaLUICS,  53:1.  pp. 69-82.
Machell, Deborah  (99'3), Iwrw  Trmifv  hI Ten Weav  SW"s, Aldersdt,  Hongkong. Avebury.
O'Higgim, Micbael,  Guter  Sclmua and  Geoffly Stepbmon (1989), 'Income Diribution  nd Redistribution:  A Microdata  Aalysis for Seven  Counrie?,  h.Iv  ojf
lNCt  dmd WellA,  p. 107.
Oaima,  Hanry (1991),  'Kuoets'  Cve  and Aaa  Income  Ditrlution'  in T. Mioguebi  (ed).  Makng  Econanal  More  deI  mod Moem  Egd:abk  Feona  Desenrankng Income  Ddsibuzdon,
Econic  rmearcb senmae  No. 29, The Inst  of Econovc Reanreb, Hitoubabu  University,  Kunitachi,  Tokyo, Kikuniya  Con_a y Ltd. and  Oxford  United  Pta.
Pdland  Central Statistical  Office (1990). BCUd  Gospodov  DomowycA  w 1989  RbOA,  Warsaw:  Ceoul  Statiicl  Office.
Pryor,  Frderic  (1990), 'Chenges in Ince  Di  dribution  in Poor Agiculural Nation: Mlawi and Malagaacar', Ewanc  Devlopm  old Oanad  Chmge, October,  p 26.
60Peacharopouloa  ct al. (1992). Powny and Income Diswibudon in LIadn  Amedca: The Srory  of  the  19&b, Wassington,  DC.:  World Bank Latin American  and the  CaribbeanTechnmcal  Dqsfametv,
Rcgiontal  sadics pnoam  tcport No.27,  Deccmber.
Rao, tUonoji (19S9)  'Income lne4uality and  Pvetly  in  East  Asia',  Indian Economuc  Journal, Oct-Dec., p.59.
Rao, Bhoaoji  (1990). 'Inome  Disribution  in Singaporm  Trends and Issucs',  3in*aporr  E&aoosk  Rei*w,  April. p. 147.
Renwci, Zbco  (1992), 'Thtec Features  of thc Distribution of Incomc During Trnnition  to Reform',  miurco.
Ringen, Stcin (1991). 'Houwlch,  Standard  of Living,  nd Inequality',  ReWew  of income  amd  Weakl, 37:1, Mamh.
Rodrigucs, Jose  Laui (1919), 'LA Eradication  de la Pubeza y Is Djisrbution  dcl Ingrso  en  Cuba', EcocnM4 de  America Lamna, 1-19:21 1.
Root, Richard (1992), 'ldeitifying  Needs  for Social Prtcwtion in Ronania: A Contrined  Enirical  Anclyai,',  minnno,  April.
Saunders,  Pctcr, Hekn Stoet  and  Garry  Hobbcs  (1991), 'Incorn  Inequality in Australia and  Ncw Zealnd',  Reew  of Income  and Wealth,  37 1, March, pp. 63-79.
Sha'ban. Radva  Ali (1990), 'Economic Inequality  in Jordan, 1973-19S6'  in Katnel Abu Jabcr, Maahcs  Buhbe  and  Mahutmnad  Smadi  (cdi),  bome  Dribudiout  it Jordan, Boulder, San  Francisco:
Wrttviev  Special  Studier  nn the Middlc Eatt.
Spain Initio  Nacionnl  de Etatistica (199),  Ecesasta  C4n  w ide  Pesupuesios Familiares.  Ano 19S8:  Meiodologla  y Resr  uadoa,  Madrid.
Tsebou,  Pama (1992), 'Ineqaity  and Welfare in EEC Countries',  RusdLen  of Economic  Researrh,  No.  I
Vakenduc,  Christian  (19S7), 'Les revcnus  disponibles  dca  rnlnages:  dcazriptio  ct analyse  de cedain types  d'inigalites',  Bladke  de Doc_wevatio,  Brucsbls:  Minisrm  des Fm nces,
Yugosavia Federal  Office of Statistice  (1990). Ankera o pouvInji  domainsrava i  199:  iRspolo5va  i i  porrbljena  sredirva: Pdoed po aanu domalinw,  Statistical  Bulletin No.17SS,  Belgrade:
Federal  Office of Statistics.
61Anex  Tabl e  Iiwome data
Purchuming  power parity (PPP)  aI international prices  GDP per capita for  1988  (sonmetimes  for  1987)  arm  obtained from Summtce  and Hcaton (1991).  The exceptions  are the data for Bulgaria,
Czcchoslovakia,Romania,  the Soviet Union, East  Gcrrrany and  Cuba  which atc obtained  from Marer ct &l  (1992). For all the cmuntriesexcept  Cuba,  the  data  reter to 1987 Fr  Cuba, to 19#8 Sirsc
theme  sources  are widely available, the data  are  not reproduced  herc.
Summerm,  Robert and Alan Hcdton  (1991), `Tbe Penn  World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded  Set  of International  Comparisoa',  Quanrey Jouna  f Economics,  vol.  106,  No. 2, May. p 327
Marer, Paul, larbo Arvay. John O'Connor, Mortin Schrenl and  Daniel Swanson  (1992), HLitorically PlanneJ Economics:  A Guide so  the Data, Washington,  DC.:  Woild  Bank
62Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1221 Does  Research  and Development  Narcy Birdsall  November  1993  S. Rajan
Contribute  to Economic  Growlh  Changyong  Rhee  33747
in Developing  Countries?
WPS1222  Trade  Reform  in Ten  Sub-Saharan  Faezeh  Foroutan  November  1993  S. Fallon
Countries:  Achievements  and Failures  38009
WPS1223  How Robust  Is a Poverty  Profile?  Marlin  Ravallion  November  1993  P.  Cook
Benu  Bidani  33902
WPS1224  Devaluation  in Low-Inflation  Miguel  A. Kiguel  November  1993  R. Luz
Economies  Nita  Ghei  39059
WPS1225 Intra-Sub-Saharan  African  Trade:  Faezeh  Foroutan  November  1993  S.  Fallon
Is It Too Little'e  Lant Pritchett  38009
WPS1226  Forecasting  Volatility  in Commodity  Kenneth  F. Kroner  November  1993  F. Hatab
Markets  Devin  P. Kneafsey  35835
Stiin Claessens
WPS1227 Designing  Water Institutions:  Marie  Leigh  Livingston  December  1993  C. Spooner
Market  Failures  and Institutional  30464
Response
WPS1228  Competition,  Competition  Policy,  Bernard  M. Hoekman  December  1993  L. O'Connor
and  the GATT  Petros  C. Mavroidis  37009
WPS1229 The  Structure,  Regulation,  and  E. P. Davis  December  1993  P. Infante
Performance  of Pension  Funds  in  37642
Nine  Industrial  Countries
WPS1230 Unemployment  in Mexico:  Its  Ana Revenga  December  1993  R. Stephen
Characteristics  and Determinants  Michelle  Riboud  37040
WPS1231 Making  a Market:  Mass  Privatization Nemat  Shafik  December  1993  A. Correa
in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics  38549
WPS1232  Will  GATT  Enforcement  Control  J. Michael  Fincer  December  1993  N. Artis
Antidumping?  K. C. Fung  37947
WPS1233  Hedging  Cotton  Price  Risk  in  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan  December  1993  D. Gustafson
Francophone  African  Countries  Elton  Thigpen  33714
Panos  Varangis
WPS1234  Price  Formation,  Nominal  Anchors,  Andres  Solimano  December  1993  S. Florez
and Stabilization  Policies  in Hungary: David  E. Yuravlivker  39075
An Empirical  AnalysisPolicy  Research Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1235  Eastern  Europe's  Experience  with  Allredo  Thorne  December  1993  N. Jose
Banking  Reform:  Is There  a Role  for  33688
Banks  in the Transition?
WPS1236  The  Impact  of Two-Tier  Producer  Maurice  Schiff  December  1993  S. Fallon
and  Consumer  Food  Pricing  in India  38009
WPS1237  Bank  Performance  and  the Impact  Yavuz  Boray  December  1993  C. Lim
of Financial  Restructuring  in a  Hector  Sierra  30864
Macroeconomic  Framework:  A New
Application
WPS1238  Kenya:  Structural  Adjustment  in the  Gurushri  Swamy  January  1994  V. Saldanha
1980s  35742
WPS1239 Principles  of Regulatory  Policy  David  E. M. Sappington  January  1994  WOR
Design  31393
WPS1240 Financing  the Storm:  Macroeconomic  William  Easterly  January  1994  R. Martin
Crisis  in Russia,  1992-93  Paulo  Vieira  da Cunha  39026
WPS1241  Regulation,  Institutions,  and  Pablo  T. Spiller  January  1994  B. Moore
Commitment  in the British  Ingo  Vogelsang  35261
Telecommunications  Sector
WPS1242  Firiancial  Policies  in Socialist  Buris Pieskovic  January  1994  M. Jandu
Countries  in Transition  33103
WPS1243  Are Institutional  Investors  an  Punam  Chuhan  January  1994  R. Vo
Important  Source  of Portfolio  Investment  31047
in Emerging  Markets?
WPS1244  Difficulties  of Transferring  Risk-  Edward  J. Kane  January  1994  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Based  Capital  Requirements  to  38526
Developing  Countries
WPS1245  The  Adding-Up  Problem:  Strategies  Takamasa  Akiyama  January  1994  A. Kim
for Primary  Commodity  Exports  Donald  F. Larson  33715
in Sub-Saharan  Africa
WPS1246 Determinants  of Cross-Country  Branko  Milanovic  January  1994  R. Martin
Income  Inequality:  An "Augmented"  39065
Kuznets' Hypothesis